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 Emotion regulation is crucially involved in individuals’ psychological health. For 
example, the frequent use of cognitive reappraisal, or changing the way one thinks about 
an emotional event, is positively associated with psychological health. Recent cross-
sectional findings have shown that the ability to use cognitive reappraisal (cognitive 
reappraisal ability; CRA) is associated with lower depression in the context of high stress. 
However, two important questions about CRA remain unexamined: 1) Does CRA predict 
long-term adjustment to stress? 2) Do the protective effects of CRA depend upon the type 
of stress encountered? To examine these questions, a community sample of men and 
women (n=181) who had recently experienced a stressful life event was recruited and a 
prospective longitudinal design was employed. Life stress severity, stressor 
controllability, and depressive symptoms were measured at Time 1 and at Time 2 (6 
months later). CRA was measured using a multi-method laboratory challenge at Time 1.  
The results of Question 1 revealed a significant prospective relationship in which CRA 
interacted with changes in life stress to predict changes in depression between Time 1 and 
Time 2. Specifically, among individuals with greater increases in stress, those with high 
CRA reported significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms relative to those 
with low CRA. For Question 2, results indicated that the protective effects of CRA 
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depend upon the stressors’ controllability. Specifically, in highly stressful contexts that 
were uncontrollable, the protective effects of CRA remained, such that high CRA was 
associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms. In highly stressful contexts that 
were controllable, the protective effects of CRA were reversed, such that high CRA was 
associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms. Thus, CRA appears to be adaptive 
in uncontrollable but maladaptive in controllable stressful contexts. Overall, these results 
suggest that, for highly stressed individuals, CRA is an important protective factor 
against long-term increases in depression. Importantly, however, these protective effects 
depend upon the type of stressful context encountered. These results have important 
implications for understanding how emotion regulation ability contributes to risk and 
resilience in the face of stress, for clinical interventions and prevention programs, and for 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Humans are emotional beings. In many situations, emotions -- even intense ones 
-- can be adaptive: they allow us to avoid or escape threats in the environment, to take 
advantage of resources that may aid our survival, and to function socially (Ellsworth & 
Smith, 1988; Izard, 1977; Keltner & Kring, 1998). In some situations, however, emotions 
may be maladaptive. For instance, feelings of intense anxiety may prevent someone from 
delivering an effective presentation, or feelings of extreme anger may negatively affect 
performance in the workplace. In such cases, it is often more adaptive to regulate our 
emotions. Emotion regulation involves the use of behavioral and cognitive strategies to 
change the duration and/or intensity of an emotion (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Although 
human beings have likely engaged in emotion regulation since antiquity, this topic was 
not heavily studied using empirical methods until the twentieth century. The 1990’s in 
particular saw a tremendous increase in research on emotion regulation, and the field has 
continued to grow. According to the online database PsycInfo, over 1400 articles listing 
“emotion regulation” as keywords have been published since 1999 (search conducted 
April 1, 2012).  
Scientific interest in this topic may be due to the fact that emotion regulation is a 
common phenomenon in people’s lives – in modern society, humans encounter a wide 
range of situations that require some form of emotion regulation. Failure to effectively 
regulate emotions could have devastating consequences for psychological health. In 
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addition, individuals have a large number of different emotion regulation strategies to 
choose from (for reviews see Gross & Thompson, 2007; Koole, 2009) and each unique 
strategy appears to have a different profile of consequences in terms of benefits (e.g., 
decreases in the experience of unwanted emotions) and costs (e.g., maladaptive 
physiological responding or impaired social functioning). This repertoire of possible 
emotion regulation strategies includes strategies focused on changing behavior (e.g., 
suppression), attention (e.g., attention control, distraction), cognitions (e.g., cognitive 
reappraisal, acceptance), and physiological reactions (e.g., deep breathing techniques).  
With such a wide variety of emotion regulation strategies at one’s disposal, it is 
important to engage in strategies that are both effective and adaptive when used. 
Throughout this paper, I define “effective” as an emotion regulation strategy that allows 
individuals to change their subjective experience of emotions in the desired direction 
without experiencing short-term costs. That is, effective emotion regulation strategies 
allow individuals to change their subjective experience of emotion without any 
detrimental physiological, social, or cognitive side effects. In contrast, I define “adaptive” 
emotion regulation strategies as strategies that contribute to longer-term beneficial 
psychological health outcomes. Based on both theoretical and empirical considerations, I 
will focus on one specific emotion regulation strategy that appears to be both effective in 
terms of allowing people to manage their emotions, and adaptive in terms of leading to 
positive psychological outcomes: cognitive reappraisal. This strategy has been defined as 
reframing the way one thinks about a stimulus in order to change its emotional impact 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
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Reappraisal is Effective 
The question of what constitutes effective emotion regulation may be best 
approached from the perspective of appraisal theory. The importance of appraisals in the 
generation and regulation of emotion has been written about and discussed for thousands 
of years, starting with philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (cf. Schorr, 2001). 
Specifically, the Platonic view holds that emotions are weaknesses that occur outside of 
people’s control and are antithetical to logic and reason. In other words, emotions simply 
happen without any regard to specific appraisals of the world around us (Lazarus, 2001). 
Aristotle argued, in contrast, that emotions are simply reflections of judgments and 
beliefs about the world – in other words, emotions are rooted in reason. Because people 
can control their judgments and beliefs, he argued, they can also control their emotions 
(Aristotle, 1941).  This emphasis on evaluations as elicitors of emotion is in contrast to 
theories of emotion that have hypothesized that events themselves automatically elicit 
emotion (Watson, 1919), perhaps through automatically generated patterns of 
physiological arousal (James, 1890; Lindsley, 1951).  
Inspired by the Aristotelian view of emotions, modern-day appraisal theorists 
have broadly defined appraisals as the meaning and significance a person assigns to an 
event or stimulus in the environment and are influenced by a person’s current goals or 
needs (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Broadly, appraisal theorists believe that “the way we 
evaluate an event determines how we react emotionally” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 87). Thus, a 
person’s appraisal of an event, not the event itself, causes an emotional reaction (Lazarus, 
1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). In this way, 
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appraisal theory can explain the observation that the same event can lead to divergent 
emotional responses for different individuals.  
Further, specific appraisals of an event should lead to the experience of specific 
emotions. For example, Lazarus theorized that events appraised as a loss are associated 
with the experience of sadness, while events appraised as a threat are associated with the 
experience of anger or fear (Lazarus, 1991). Research on appraisals supports Lazarus’ 
argument -- people exposed to comparable events, either in the laboratory or in a 
naturalistic setting, display a wide variety of emotional reactions depending on their 
specific appraisals of the event (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997; 
Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Conversely, individuals faced 
with very different events may experience the same emotional reactions if they engage in 
the same pattern of appraisals. For example, completely different events such as a 
breakup and a job loss could both lead to feelings of sadness if they are both appraised as 
losses, or could lead to feelings of relief and happiness if they are appraised as beneficial 
(Roseman & Smith, 2001).  
Within this theoretical framework, then, appraisals are of critical importance in 
the emotion generation process. Thus, emotion regulation strategies that target appraisals 
should be particularly effective because these strategies would change the underlying 
cause of the emotion itself. Without a change to the underlying appraisal, however, it 
should be much more difficult to change the experience of an emotion because the 
existing cause of the emotion will persist. With this theoretical framework in mind, 
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cognitive reappraisal should be a particularly effective strategy because, by definition, it 
directly targets appraisals.  
Cross-sectional laboratory studies have supported this hypothesis. Specifically, it 
has been shown that the use of cognitive reappraisal is effective in two important ways. 
First, cognitive reappraisal is associated with the successful down-regulation of negative 
emotions and second, the use of reappraisal is not associated with negative “side effects.” 
For example, Gross (1998) showed disgusting film clips to undergraduates and asked 
them to either reappraise their emotions, suppress their emotions, or simply watch the 
film.  Results indicated that participants who suppressed their reactions to the film were 
able to decrease their outward expressions of disgust, but still experienced the same 
amount of disgust as those who simply watched the film.  Those who suppressed their 
emotional responses also experienced more peripheral physiological responding than the 
reappraisal or control groups.  In contrast, the group that reappraised had no significant 
increase in physiological responding and reported experiencing less disgust. Several other 
laboratory studies that have induced other negative emotions have found the same pattern 
of results: the use of reappraisal is associated with decreases in the experience of negative 
emotion without any increases in maladaptive physiological responding (Dandoy & 
Goldstein, 1990; Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006; Jackson, Malmstadt, 
Larson, & Davidson, 2000; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & Rankin, 1965). Subsequent 
studies have found that cognitive reappraisal has no negative effects on memory for 
emotional events (Egloff et al., 2006; Richards & Gross, 2000) or social functioning 
(Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, Erickson, & Gross, 2003; Lopes, Salovey, Cote, & 
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Beers, 2005), while other types of emotion regulation do. Thus, reappraisal seems to be a 
particularly effective emotion regulation strategy – it leads to decreases in the experience 
of negative emotion, but those who use it do not pay any physiological, cognitive, or 
social price. 
 Subsequent studies have illustrated that, in addition to down-regulating negative 
emotions, reappraisal can also be used to increase the experience of positive emotions. 
For example, Mauss and colleagues (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007) found that 
individuals who reported frequently using reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy 
experienced less anger and less maladaptive physiological responding in a laboratory 
anger induction than those who did not report using reappraisal frequently. In addition, 
the frequent reappraisers reported experiencing more positive emotions during the anger 
task. Similarly, Haga and colleagues (Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009) found that the self-
reported use of reappraisal was associated with both lower levels of negative affect as 
well as higher levels of positive affect. This lends support to the idea that reappraisal can 
be used effectively to decrease unwanted negative emotions, as well as to increase the 
experience of positive emotions.  
 Overall then, cognitive reappraisal appears to provide a very effective way to 
regulate emotions. People can use it to either down-regulate unwanted negative emotions, 
or to up-regulate positive emotions. In addition, those who engage in cognitive 





Reappraisal is Adaptive 
As illustrated above, cognitive reappraisal appears to be very effective for 
regulating emotions. In addition, cognitive reappraisal also appears to be adaptive – its 
use is associated with beneficial long-term psychological health outcomes. Broadly, I use 
the term “psychological health” to refer to greater positive (e.g., well-being, satisfaction 
with life) as well as lower negative (e.g., depression, anxiety) psychological health 
outcomes. Below, I review empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that the use of 
reappraisal is associated with both of these facets of psychological health.  
Reappraisal and psychological health. Few studies have examined the role of 
reappraisal and psychological health outcomes in healthy populations. The small number 
of studies that have been conducted, however, seem to converge on a common pattern. 
For example, Gross and John (2003; John & Gross, 2004) have examined the relationship 
between cognitive reappraisal use and positive outcomes over time. They found that the 
use of cognitive reappraisal, as measured with a self-report trait measure, was associated 
with greater overall levels of well-being, including measures of self-esteem, life 
satisfaction, and optimism. Haga et al (2009) similarly found that the use of CR was 
associated with higher levels of satisfaction with life in an international sample of 
undergraduates. These studies suggest that there are individual differences in daily 
reappraisal use, and that those who report using cognitive reappraisal are more likely to 
experience increased psychological health. 
A large body of research has also examined the role of reappraisal use and 
decreases in negative psychological health outcomes. In several studies, Garnefski and 
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colleagues have found a robust negative relationship between self-reported use of 
reappraisal and depression (Garnefski, Baan, & Kraaij, 2005; Garnefski, Boon, & Kraaij, 
2003; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). In a longitudinal 
study using a sample of older adults, the negative relationship between cognitive 
reappraisal and depression was replicated at a two and a half year follow-up session, 
which suggests that this relationship persists over time (Kraaij, Pruymboom, & 
Garnefski, 2002). The self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal is also associated with 
less trait anxiety (Egloff et al., 2006). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis found that self-
reported reappraisal use (in both clinical and non-clinical samples) is associated with 
fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety, which suggests that the link between 
reappraisal and these two outcomes is robust (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 
2010). In addition, the use of reappraisal has been associated with fewer symptoms of 
acute stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie, 
2001; Fairbank, Hansen, & Fitterling, 1991). Taken together, these studies suggest that 
there is a robust association between self-reported reappraisal use and decreased negative 
psychological health outcomes such as depression. Specifically, those who report 
frequently engaging in reappraisal are less likely to experience a range of psychological 
health problems. 
Reappraisal in the context of stress. The studies reviewed so far have examined 
the main effect between reappraisal use and psychological health. However, the use of 
reappraisal should be particularly important in one specific context – that of high life 
stress. That is, reappraisal may act as an important protective factor against negative 
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outcomes by supplying an effective way to manage the negative emotions that 
accompany stress.  
 Exposure to stressful life events is associated with increased risk for a host of 
negative outcomes, including negative physical health outcomes (Feldman, Bensing, & 
deRuijter, 2007; Koh, Choe, Song, & Lee, 2006; Miller & Blackwell, 2006) and a host of 
negative psychological health outcomes including depression (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt, 
Taylor, Craig, Harrington, et al., 2003; Hawley, Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2007; Monroe, 
Slavich, Torres, & Gotlib, 2007; Tennant, 2002), anxiety (Tsoory, Cohen, & Richter-
Levin, 2007), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Importantly, 
however, this is only true on average. Indeed, most people who are exposed to stressful 
life events do not exhibit any of these unwanted consequences. In a recent study, for 
example, 60% of people who had recently experienced traumatic injury displayed low 
levels of depressive symptomatology over a six month period (deRoon-Cassini, Mancini, 
Rusch, & Bonanno, 2010). These results are in line with existing evidence that has shown 
that the majority of people exposed to very serious stressful events such as the death of a 
loved one can be characterized as resilient – that is, even after exposure to severe stress 
or trauma, most people maintain normal levels of psychological functioning (Bonanno, 
2004; 2005; Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & Wallace, 2006). Impressively, many people 
even experience positive outcomes or personal growth after stress exposure (Park, Mills-
Baxter, & Fenster, 2005; Woodward & Joseph, 2003).  
These findings raise an important question: Could the use of cognitive reappraisal 
be a particularly important contributor to psychological health in the context of high 
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stress? Recently, there has been increasing interest in emotion regulation as a critical 
contributor to resilience in the context of stress (for a review see Troy & Mauss, 2011). 
This increased interest may be due to the finding that the experience of stress is 
inherently emotional – exposure to stress tends to lead to increases in negative emotions 
(Feldman, Cohen, Lepore, Matthews, Kamarck, & Marsland, 1999). From this 
perspective then, unregulated negative emotions may serve as an important mediator of 
the relationship between stress and psychological health problems. Within this 
framework then, those individuals who can effectively regulate their emotions using a 
strategy like cognitive reappraisal may be protected against psychological health 
problems in the context of stress by directly targeting and regulating this increase in 
negative emotions (Troy & Mauss, 2011). Specifically, the use of positive reappraisal, 
which consists of reframing emotional events in a more positive light, may be a 
particularly adaptive strategy in the context of high stress (Troy et al., 2010). 
Several studies on positive reappraisal in highly stressed populations provide 
initial support for this hypothesis. For example, in a sample of highly stressed people 
caring for patients with Multiple Sclerosis, Pakenham (2005) found that the self-reported 
use of reappraisal was associated with a lower incidence of negative psychological health 
outcomes. Similar results have been found in patient populations with chronic medical 
problems (van der Veek, Kraaij, Van Koppen, Garnefski, & Joekes, 2007; Young & 
McNicoll, 1998) and individuals exposed to trauma (Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 
2008). Additionally, Folkman & Moskowitz (2000a) noted that among caregivers for 
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AIDS patients, those who frequently engaged in cognitive reappraisal experienced more 
positive emotions both during care giving and after the death of the patient.  
Extending these findings by using an experimental intervention in a sample of 
HIV positive men, Carrico and colleagues examined the moderating effects of a 
cognitive-behavioral stress management (CBSM) intervention on the relationship 
between stress and depression (Carrico, Antoni, Weaver, Lechner, & Schneiderman, 
2005). Over the ten-week treatment period, the men who received the CBSM intervention 
showed significant decreases in depressive symptomatology, and this decrease was 
mediated by self-reported increases in the use of reappraisal, which suggests that the use 
of reappraisal may have been the mechanism of change in these patients. A subsequent 
study administered an internet based intervention for individuals experiencing 
complicated grief (Wagner, Knaevelsrud, & Maercker, 2007). Importantly, one of the 
three modules was dedicated solely to cognitive reappraisal exercises. At the end of the 
5-week treatment period, those in the intervention group reported lower levels of 
depression and anxiety symptoms, and increases in post-traumatic growth relative to the 
wait-list control group (Wagner et al., 2007).  
All of these studies converge on the conclusion that the use of cognitive reappraisal in 
highly stressful circumstances is associated with better psychological health outcomes. 
Thus, these studies support the hypothesis that the use of cognitive reappraisal could 
serve as a critical protective factor against psychological health problems, and that this 
protective function may be particularly important in highly stressful, relative to less 
stressful, contexts.  
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The Importance of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability 
 While the literature reviewed above is critical in providing insight into the 
effectiveness and adaptiveness of cognitive reappraisal, many important open questions 
remain. One particularly important area of inquiry is related to the fact that nearly all of 
the research on this topic to date has relied on self-report trait measures of cognitive 
reappraisal use in daily life.  The most commonly used self-report measure is the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), a 10-item questionnaire in which individuals 
are asked to report how frequently they use cognitive reappraisal and suppression to 
regulate their emotions (John & Gross, 2003). The ERQ has shown high reliability (John 
& Gross, 2003), and, as shown above, is associated with increased psychological health. 
There are, however, several possible limitations that could be associated with self-reports 
of reappraisal use.  
First, previous research has shown that retrospective self-report measures are 
subject to social desirability and self-presentational biases (Schwarz, 1999). For this 
reason, measures like the ERQ may over-estimate how frequently reappraisal is used. 
Additionally, more recent research has found that retrospective self-reports of emotion 
regulation are prone to biases caused by one’s current emotional state (Wilhelm & 
Grossman, 2010), or by personality factors such as self-esteem (Robinson & Feldman 
Barrett, 2010). Overall then, retrospective self-reports of emotion regulation use may not 
be entirely accurate due to reporting biases. 
In addition to these reporting biases, it may also be that many individuals cannot 
accurately introspect upon their use of emotion regulation strategies (cf. Todd, Tennen, 
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Carney, Armeli, & Affleck, 2004). For example, there is a growing body of evidence that 
many aspects of emotion regulation operate on an implicit level, below the level of 
conscious awareness (Hopp, Troy, & Mauss, 2011; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 
2006). Additionally, van Reekum and colleagues (van Reekum, Johnstone, Urry, Thurow, 
Schaefer, Alexander, et al., 2007) found that the effects of reappraisal instructions on 
neural activation were significantly reduced when they accounted for eye gaze behavior. 
Thus, although participants were instructed to use reappraisal, many individuals appeared 
to instead be using attentional deployment strategies to change their emotions by, for 
example, averting their eyes from negative images. These results suggest that some 
individuals may simply not understand the definition of reappraisal, or may be unable to 
use reappraisal effectively. If this is the case, it would be unreasonable to ask people to 
report on the use of this strategy.  
 In addition to the limitations associated with self-report measures described 
above, it remains unclear what construct(s) the ERQ and similar measures are truly 
measuring. For instance, the face validity of the items on the ERQ suggests that it 
measures frequency of reappraisal use in daily life (e.g., “When I want to feel less 
negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation.”). It is possible, 
however, that individuals’ answers on the ERQ capture other facets of reappraisal such as 
motivation and desire to use reappraisal, or the ability to use reappraisal. In this way, the 
ERQ may be collapsing several different facets of reappraisal into one measure. 
If the ERQ is indeed collapsing across several different facets of cognitive 
reappraisal, existing research using this measure does not allow conclusions to be drawn 
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about the nature of these different facets or how they may relate to psychological health. 
It may be, for instance, that the frequency of reappraisal use predicts psychological health 
outcomes differently than the motivation or the ability to use reappraisal. Although many 
potential facets of reappraisal could be studied, one facet stands out as being theoretically 
important in terms of long-term resilience: ability. That is, individuals’ actual ability to 
successfully change their experience of unwanted emotions may contribute to positive 
psychological health outcomes. Further, the ability to use reappraisal may be a 
particularly important predictor of psychological health in contexts that are highly 
emotionally charged, such as high stress contexts. In this way, individuals high in 
reappraisal ability could effectively down-regulate their negative emotions by changing 
the appraisals that cause them.  
Indeed, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) have suggested that a person’s ability to 
flexibly use effective regulation strategies as required by situational demands is a 
particularly important contributor to psychological health. In support of this hypothesis, 
Bonanno (2004) has found that the ability to flexibly express or suppress emotional 
expressions is a long-term predictor of resilience in the face of severe stress. Although 
this work focused only on the regulation of behavior and not of subjective emotional 
experience, it is important in suggesting that emotion regulation ability may be an 
important predictor of psychological health. Thus, reappraisal ability may uniquely 
predict mental health outcomes over and above other facets of reappraisal in the context 
of high stress.  
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To begin testing the hypothesis that ability may be a particularly important facet 
of cognitive reappraisal, recent work has focused specifically on measuring cognitive 
reappraisal ability (CRA). That is, instead of using self-reported use, this research has 
used laboratory measures of emotional responding to gage how successful individuals are 
when they attempt to use reappraisal to change their subjective experience of emotion. 
For example, Wager and colleagues were among the first researchers to develop a 
measure of CRA (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). They showed 
participants in an fMRI study negative pictures and instructed participants to just look at 
half of the pictures and to use reappraisal while viewing the other half of the pictures. 
CRA was operationalized as the decrease in self-reported negative emotion from the just 
watch condition to the reappraisal condition. Using a similar paradigm, McRae and 
colleagues (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012) found that performance on a 
laboratory challenge measure of CRA was empirically distinct from self-reported 
reappraisal use, supporting the hypothesis that the frequency of using reappraisal and the 
ability to use reappraisal are separate constructs.  
Similarly, Shiota and Levenson (2009) used disgusting and sad film clips to 
induce emotions in the laboratory. They experimentally manipulated the use of 
reappraisal by instructing participants to use positive reappraisal during some of the film 
clips. CRA was indexed by changes in self-reported subjective emotional response, as 
well as physiological and behavioral response. Shiota and Levenson also measured self-
reported reappraisal ability. Results indicated that self-reported ability was not strongly 
correlated with actual ability as measured by the laboratory paradigm. There was also a 
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high degree of variability in reappraisal ability across individuals. This study provides 
support for the idea that people are not able to accurately report on their ability to use 
reappraisal and highlights the importance of using laboratory paradigms for providing 
accurate measures of reappraisal ability.  
 Building upon Shiota and Levenson’s methods, Troy and colleagues (Troy, 
Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010) examined how individual differences in CRA relate 
to psychological health. Similar to the paradigm used by Shiota and Levenson (2009), 
Troy and colleagues used film clips to induce sadness in the laboratory. During one of the 
film clips, participants received instructions to use positive reappraisal. CRA was indexed 
by changes in self-reported sadness and skin conductance level from the uninstructed sad 
clip to the instructed sad clip. Results indicated that CRA interacted with life stress to 
predict depressive symptoms. Specifically, individuals high in CRA exhibited less 
depressive symptoms under high stress circumstances as compared to individuals low in 
CRA. Reappraisal ability was unrelated to depression in the context of low life stress. 
These results held when controlling for self-reported trait reappraisal use, which suggests 
that reappraisal ability predicts depressive symptoms above and beyond self-reported use 
of reappraisal.  
This research is an important first step in investigating how people’s ability to 
change their emotional states using reappraisal relates to psychological health outcomes. 
Its results suggest that CRA may be an important protective factor against negative 
outcomes such as depression, particularly among highly stressed populations. It may be 
that CRA is particularly important in high stress contexts because it provides people with 
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an effective way to manage the negative emotions that accompany highly stressful 
circumstances. These findings also suggest that the ability to use positive reappraisal 
(reframing events more positively) may be a particularly adaptive process in the context 
of high stress. For this reason, the present study specifically examines the ability to use 
positive reappraisal. For the remainder of the paper, the term “cognitive reappraisal 
ability” refers specifically to the ability to use positive reappraisal, rather than other 
subtypes of reappraisal.  
Taken together, the literature reviewed so far highlights four important insights 
about cognitive reappraisal: 1) Cognitive reappraisal is effective – it provides a way to 
successfully regulate the subjective experience of emotions without any accompanying 
physiological, cognitive, or social costs, 2) The dispositional use of cognitive reappraisal 
is adaptive – it is associated with better psychological health both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally, and it appears to contribute to resilience in the context of high stress, 3) 
The ability to use reappraisal may be a critical contributor to psychological health over 
and above the contributions of dispositional cognitive reappraisal use, 4) Cognitive 
reappraisal ability may be particularly important for psychological health in highly 
stressful, relative to less stressful, contexts.     
However, several questions pertaining to cognitive reappraisal remain 
unanswered. The current study seeks to provide answers to two particularly important 
questions related to CRA, which will allow for a better understanding of how this 
construct relates to psychological health over time and across contexts.  
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Question One: Does Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Have Long-Term Effects On 
Psychological Health? 
 As noted above, the construct of cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA) is fairly new 
and has not been widely studied. The small amount of research that has been conducted, 
however, suggests that in the immediate aftermath of a stressor, CRA is associated with 
better psychological health outcomes (Troy et al., 2010). Unfortunately, however, all of 
the research on CRA to date has been cross-sectional (Shiota & Levenson, 2009; Troy et 
al., 2010; Wager et al., 2008). For this reason, it remains unclear whether the beneficial 
cross-sectional effects of CRA on psychological health would translate into longer-term 
psychological health outcomes.  
Additionally, cross-sectional designs do not allow for strong causal claims. Based 
on the existing findings, it is not clear that CRA causally contributes to psychological 
health outcomes and not the other way around. For example, low CRA may simply be a 
side-effect of elevated depression in the context of high stress. Indeed, previous research 
on individuals with anxiety and mood disorders has found that these disordered 
individuals are more likely to rely on maladaptive coping strategies such as suppression 
or avoidance, rather than adaptive strategies like reappraisal (Betts, Gullone, & Allen, 
2009; Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007). Although this line of research did not examine 
CRA directly, these findings could be explained by the hypothesis that disordered 




Research that has directly measured CRA and psychological health outcomes 
provides some argument against the hypothesis that low CRA is simply a side effect or a 
consequence of low psychological health. First, in the study of CRA conducted by Troy 
and colleagues (2010), there was no direct relationship between CRA and depression – 
only the interaction between CRA and life stress was significant. Similarly, a study 
conducted by Ehring and colleagues (Ehring, Fischer, Schnülle, Bösterling, & Tuschen-
Caffier, 2008) found that recovered-depressed individuals reported high levels of 
maladaptive emotion regulation relative to never-depressed individuals, which suggests 
that low CRA may not simply be a side effect of one’s current depressive state. These 
findings add support to the hypothesis that deficits in emotion regulation ability act as 
risk factors for the development of psychopathology (Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Kring & 
Werner, 2004).  
While the existing cross-sectional evidence provides some support for the notion 
that CRA causally contributes to improved psychological health, the current lack of 
longitudinal studies does not allow for strong causal conclusions. Thus, prospective 
longitudinal designs are needed in order to examine CRA as a predictor of changes in 
psychological health over time. Specifically, if CRA interacts with changes in stress over 
time to predict changes in depressive symptoms over time, this would support the 
hypothesis that increased CRA causes decreases in depression over time, particularly for 
those with larger increases in stress. That is, if individual differences in CRA precede 
changes in both stress and depression, we can be more confident that CRA plays a causal 
role in psychological health. In addition, longitudinal designs would provide evidence 
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about the time course of the relationship between CRA and psychological health in the 
context of stress.  
To address these open questions, the current study used a prospective longitudinal 
design in a community sample of adults who had recently been exposed to a stressful life 
event. During Time 1, participants completed the laboratory measure of CRA, in addition 
to self-report measures of life stress severity and depressive symptoms. Time 2 took place 
six months later, and participants completed self-report measures of current depressive 
symptoms and current life stress severity.  
This study design includes several key elements that extend existing research. 
First, the use of a large (N=181) community sample (both men and women aged 21-60) 
yields highly generalizable results. Second, the sample consists of people who have been 
exposed to a recent stressful life event, which will allow CRA to be measured in a 
context that appears to be critically important: high stress. Third, life stress and 
depressive symptoms were measured at two time points, allowing for the assessment of 
change over time. Fourth, this study used the previously validated (see Troy et al., 2010) 
laboratory measure of CRA rather than self-reports.  
The current study tests the hypothesis that high CRA, in interaction with change 
in life stress over time, is associated with greater decreases in depressive symptoms over 
a six-month period. This hypothesis is examined both cross-sectionally (to replicate past 
results) and longitudinally (to extend past results). The hypothesis will be supported if 
individuals with higher levels of CRA and higher levels of life stress at Time 2 
(controlling for life stress at Time 1) report larger decreases in depressive symptoms over 
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time compared to those individuals who are high in life stress at Time 2 but low in CRA. 
No differences in depressive symptoms as a function of CRA are predicted for 
individuals low in life stress at Time Two. 
Question Two: Is Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Maladaptive In Specific Types of 
Stressful Contexts? 
 As discussed above, existing evidence suggests that CRA is most protective in 
highly stressful contexts relative to less stressful contexts (Troy et al., 2010). Importantly, 
these results were significant in a sample that included a very diverse range of stressful 
life events, including sudden job loss, divorce, and experiencing the death of a close 
family member. Thus, CRA may be an adaptive process across a wide range of stressful 
contexts. The relative usefulness of CRA in high stress contexts may be due to the fact 
that stress exposure leads to increases in negative emotion (Feldman, Cohen, Lepore, 
Matthews, Kamarck, & Marsland, 1999). From this perspective, one’s ability to regulate 
negative emotions is important in all highly stressful contexts because there will likely be 
more negative emotions that need to be regulated effectively.  
 Although the protective effects of CRA appear to hold across a wide range of 
stressful circumstances, there may be important exceptions to this observation. Indeed, 
theorists across the social sciences have argued that no psychological process is 
inherently adaptive in all contexts (Darley, 1992; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000b; 
Mischel, 1968; O’Mara, McNulty, & Karney, 2011). In addition, many personality 
psychologists have emphasized the importance of person by situation interactions in 
explaining human behavior (Blass, 1991; Ender & Magnusson, 1976; Murray & 
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Kluckhohn, 1953). This raises the question of whether there are contexts in which CRA 
may be relatively less adaptive, or may even be maladaptive (i.e., associated with 
negative psychological health outcomes). What contextual factors might moderate the 
adaptiveness of reappraisal? From a theoretical perspective, CRA would appear to be 
more useful in stressful contexts in which it is important to change one’s emotional 
reactions to a stressor. With this in mind, are there any stressful circumstances in which it 
might not be critical -- or maybe even counterproductive -- to regulate one’s emotions?  
Research on self-control may provide an answer to this question. Many self-
control researchers have made the distinction between primary and secondary control 
(Heckhausen & Schulz, 1993; 1995; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Schulz & 
Heckhausen, 1996). Heckhausen and Schulz (1995) defined primary control as “bringing 
the environment into line with one’s wishes” (p. 285). Based on this definition, examples 
of primary control include active problem solving such as putting out a fire in one’s home 
with a fire extinguisher. Secondary control, on the other hand, involves “bringing oneself 
in line with the environment” (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995, p. 285). That is, secondary 
control involves making changes within oneself, often by changing one’s goals, 
expectations, or cognitions, in order to cope with stress. Based on this definition, 
examples of secondary control often involve attempts at emotion regulation, such as 
downplaying the importance or impact of a negative event. Within this definition, then, 
the use of cognitive reappraisal would be considered a secondary control strategy.  
 In the coping literature, the distinction between primary and secondary control is 
paralleled by the distinction between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping, 
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respectively (see Folkman, 1984 and Folkman & Lazarus, 1980 for reviews). For 
example, Folkman (1984) defined problem-focused coping as attempting to directly 
manage the problem that is causing distress through strategies such as active problem 
solving, decision making, and seeking instrumental support from others. On the other 
hand, Folkman defined emotion-focused coping as attempting to regulate the distress that 
has been caused by using strategies like cognitive reappraisal. Indeed, Folkman (1984) 
explicitly states that she considers secondary control a form of emotion-focused coping 
because it involves “efforts to accommodate oneself to uncontrollable events” (Folkman, 
1984, p. 844). Based on these definitions then, it appears that the use of CRA could be 
considered an example of emotion-focused coping.  
 Importantly, Folkman (1984) notes the context in which she believes emotion-
focused coping is particularly well suited: uncontrollable stress. That is, in circumstances 
where an individual has no control over the stressor that is occurring, problem-focused 
coping may be ineffective or even counterproductive. By engaging in emotion-focused 
coping, however, an individual may be able to decrease their levels of distress and 
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 Although the theoretical distinction between primary and secondary control maps on to the distinction 
between problem -focused and emotion-focused coping, only the coping literature has made specific 
predictions about controllable and uncontrollable contexts. For this reason, I will use the terms problem-




For example, consider someone who is about to lose her job because of poor 
performance at work. This kind of stressor could be considered at least somewhat 
controllable because this individual could attempt to improve her performance. To cope 
with this stressor then, the most adaptive course of action would be to engage in problem-
focused coping by, for instance, putting in longer hours at work and meeting with her 
bosses to see how she can improve her performance. Engaging in emotion-focused 
coping, on the other hand, would probably not be adaptive. In fact, engaging in an 
emotion-focused strategy like cognitive reappraisal may even hinder her ability to engage 
in problem-focused coping because this may use precious time and cognitive resources 
that could otherwise be used for more active coping. In addition, if this individual is able 
to successfully down-regulate her negative emotions using cognitive reappraisal, she may 
no longer be motivated to engage in direct action or other forms of active coping. That is, 
the presence of negative emotions in the context of controllable stressors may be 
adaptive, in that they may provide the motivation to actively cope with the stressor at 
hand.  
Now consider a more uncontrollable circumstance – someone who is about to lose 
her job due to layoffs during a difficult economic period. This context is considerably 
less controllable than the first – there may be nothing this individual can do in order to 
prevent the job loss. In this context then, it may be more adaptive to engage in emotion-
focused coping by, for instance, attempting to reframe the situation more positively in 
order to regulate her emotions and come to terms with the reality of the situation. 
Engaging in problem-focused coping, however, would seem maladaptive because direct 
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attempts to change the situation would most likely fail. Within this theoretical 
framework, problem-focused coping would be particularly adaptive in controllable 
stressful contexts and emotion-focused coping would be particularly adaptive in 
uncontrollable stressful contexts.  
Research using self-report checklist measures of stress and coping provides some 
initial support for the idea that emotion-focused coping is more adaptive in uncontrollable 
stressful contexts. In stressful circumstances perceived as uncontrollable, people are more 
likely to report engaging in emotion-focused coping strategies like reappraisal, relative to 
situations that are perceived as controllable (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). In addition, Collins, Baum, & Singer (1983) studied the 
residents of Three Mile Island (survivors of an uncontrollable nuclear accident) and 
found that those who reported using more emotion-focused coping in response to the 
event reported lower levels of psychological distress.  
In stressful situations that are uncontrollable, however, cognitive reappraisal may 
be associated with worse psychological health For example, in a four-year longitudinal 
study, participants with the tendency to form positive appraisals of stressful events were 
significantly more depressed when they experienced severe, controllable stressors, 
relative to those who experienced less severe, controllable stressors (O’Mara et al., 2011). 
No studies to date, however, have examined cognitive reappraisal ability simultaneously 
in both controllable and uncontrollable stressful contexts.  
Based on the theoretical arguments and the literature reviewed above, CRA 
appears to provide a particularly effective way to regulate emotions in the context of 
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stress. Further, based on the theoretical framework described in this section, because 
CRA is an emotion-focused strategy, it should be particularly protective in stressful 
situations that are uncontrollable, relative to stressors that are controllable. More 
specifically, CRA may be particularly well-suited to allow people to manage their 
negative emotions in uncontrollable circumstances because more active forms of coping 
are not possible. In the context of controllable stress, however, CRA should be less 
adaptive or even maladaptive, because this context is better suited for the use of active 
coping strategies, rather than emotion-focused ones. 
In order to address this important question of whether the protective effects of 
CRA differ depending upon the controllability of stressors that have been experienced, 
the current study uses the same community sample that was described in the Question 
One section above. Importantly, a measure of stressor controllability (for stressors 
encountered by the participants in the community sample) was provided by a matched 
sample of independent coders, which yields a relatively objective measure of stressor 
controllability.  
A large body of research has examined stressor controllability, which has been 
defined as the degree to which “potential outcomes …can be influenced by human 
actions” (Heth & Somer, 2002, p. 885). However, much of this research has used non-
human subjects (Brown, Hurley, Repucci, & Drugan, 2001; Wellman, Cullen, & 
Pelleymounter, 1998), or has experimentally manipulated stressor controllability in the 
lab, rather than studying naturally occurring stressful life events (Friedland, Keinan, & 
Regev, 1992; Peters, Godaert, Ballieux, van Vliet, Willemsen, Sweep, & Heijnen, 1998; 
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Watanabe, Iwanaga, & Ozeki, 2002). Additionally, the small body of research that has 
studied naturally occurring life events has relied on subjective self-report measures of 
perceived controllability (Folkman, 1984; Puente-Diaz & Anshel, 2005; Terry, 1991). 
Previous research has shown that an individual’s subjective perception of stressor 
controllability can be confounded with several personality factors, including locus of 
control, pessimism, and self-efficacy (Heth & Somer, 2002). Additionally, one’s 
perception of controllability may be confounded with one’s ability to respond to and 
actively cope with stress (Hiroto, 1974; Rosenbaum & Ben-Ari, 1985). For these reasons, 
subjective ratings of controllability may yield biased or inaccurate estimates that may be 
confounded with other study variables such as depression.  
For this reason, I developed a relatively objective measure of stressor 
controllability for the present study (see Measures section below). This measure of 
controllability was collected in addition to the laboratory measure of CRA and the self-
report measures of cumulative life stress and depressive symptoms. Each of these self-
report measures was collected during the laboratory session at Time 1 and at Time 2, 
which will allow for the assessment of changes in cumulative stress, stressor 
controllability, and depressive symptoms over a six month period. The addition of a 
measure of stressor controllability allowed me to test the hypothesis that CRA interacts 
with both stress level and controllability of stress to predict depressive symptoms. 
Specifically, I hypothesized that CRA will be most protective against negative outcomes 
under high stress conditions that are relatively uncontrollable. In the context of relatively 
controllable stress, on the other hand, I expect the protective effect of CRA to be 
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diminished or even reversed, because this is a context in which CRA should be less 
protective against negative outcomes. Because I expect these relationships to predict 
changes in psychological health over time, I predict that this three-way interaction will be 
present cross-sectionally (at Time 1), as well as prospectively (when examining changes 





Chapter Two: Method 
Participants 
A community sample of 181 men and women between the ages of 21 and 60 participated 
in this study. To qualify, all participants were required to be native English speakers and 
to have experienced a stressful life event (SLE) within the past eight weeks. For the 
purposes of this study, an SLE was defined as an event with a clearly defined starting 
point within the past eight weeks (i.e., an acute instead of a chronic stressor) that has had 
a significant, negative impact on participants’ lives. Examples of SLEs included in the 
sample are: death of a spouse or close family member, injury of self or close family 
member, divorce, sudden unemployment, and exposure to crime. The inclusion of many 
different types of stressors allows us to study the role of cognitive reappraisal ability as a 
general mechanism across a wide range of stressors and stress levels. Participants were 
recruited through postings online such as Craigslist, and by posting flyers in public areas 
such as laundromats, libraries, and local hospitals. The sample mirrors the racial and 
ethnic makeup of the Denver Metro area. In terms of race, the sample was 85% European 
American, 6% African American, 1% Asian American, and about 8% reported other or 
multiple races. In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 7% Hispanic/Latino. Participants 






The study consisted of two time points over the course of six months. Time 1 took 
place within eight weeks of each participant’s SLE. Time 2 occurred six months after 
Time 1. At both time points, participants completed questionnaires measuring cumulative 
life stress and depressive symptoms. At the end of Time 1, the laboratory reappraisal 
ability task was administered (see Appendix B, Figure 1). Participants were seated alone 
in front of a computer monitor in a quiet lab room. The experimenter connected sensors 
to each participant’s fingers and stomach in order to collect physiological measurements 
during the task. Each participant was presented with a short (three minutes) emotionally 
neutral video clip depicting scenes from a nature film. After the film clip, participants 
rated the amount of 13 different emotions, including sadness, they felt during the film 
clip on nine-point Likert scales in order to establish baseline levels of emotion. Next, 
participants were presented with three film clips pretested to induce moderate amounts of 
sadness. These clips came from the following films: Fatal Attraction, I Am Sam, and 
Kramer vs. Kramer. Film clips have been widely used in previous research to induce 
sadness (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007) and are 
considered more ecologically valid and more intense than still pictures or words 
(Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). Each of these film clips is approximately two minutes 
long, depicts a personal interaction (each of these films show two people discussing an 
emotional event) and have received similar normative ratings of moderate sadness in 
previous research (Troy et al., 2010).   
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During two of the sad film clips, participants were simply asked to “please watch 
the following film clip carefully.” During one of the sad film clips, participants were 
asked to reappraise the situation they are watching in order to decrease its emotional 
impact. The instructions for this condition are presented as follows: 
 Please watch the following film clip carefully. This time, as you watch, try 
to think about the situation you see in a more positive light. You can 
achieve this in several different ways. For example, try to imagine advice 
that you could give to the characters in the film clip to make them feel 
better. This could be advice that would help them think about the positive 
bearing this event could have on their lives. Or, think about the good 
things they might learn from this experience. Keep in mind that even 
though a situation may be painful in the moment, in the long run, it could 
make one’s life better, or have unexpected good outcomes. In other words, 
try to think about the situation in as positive terms as you possibly can. 
This can be difficult at times, so it is very important that you try your best. 
Please ask the research assistant if you have any questions about this 
task. It is very important that you carefully watch the film clip, but think 
about it from a positive perspective. 
 
These instructions are based on writing techniques used in clinical research to 
encourage patients to reframe a stressful event in a more positive way. (Lange, van de 
Ven, & Schrieken, 2003; Lange et al., 2003; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). Although other 
techniques have been used previously for reappraisal instructions, such as self-distancing 
(Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel, Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000), or denying the 
reality of the event (Gross & Levenson, 1993) the reframing technique we use seems to 
provide a high degree of ecological validity, and closely mirrors the definition of 
cognitive reappraisal as laid out by Gross (Gross & Thompson, 2007). These instructions 
also avoid explicitly telling the participant to feel less sad while reappraising, thus 
avoiding potential demand characteristics in the self-report data. In addition, these 
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instructions give specific examples of how one could use reappraisal while watching the 
film clip. Thus, it should be more likely that each person will be able to successfully use 
reappraisal when instructed to. 
After the presentation of each film clip, participants were asked to report the 
greatest amount of 13 different emotions, including sadness, that they experienced during 
the clip. In order to account for possible habituation to the sad film clips, participants 
were randomly assigned to two groups. The order of the film clips was the same for both 
groups, but the order of the emotion regulation instructions differed (see Appendix B, 
Figure 1). Group 1 was given instructions to reappraise on the second sad film, whereas 
Group 2 was given instructions to reappraise on the third sad film. The remaining sad 
films for each group served as controls. By changing the film in which participants 
reappraised, I am able to account for possible habituation (decrease in sadness over each 
subsequent film clip) by comparing sadness ratings on the films between groups. This 
design also allows for the examination of changes within individuals. Because neither 
group is reappraising during the first sad film clip, sadness ratings during this film are 
used as a sadness baseline.   
Measures 
Life stress. The cumulative negative impact of stressful life events was measured 
with the Life Experiences Survey at Time 1 and Time 2 (LES; Sarason, Johnson, & 
Siegel, 1978). This measure consists of 46 items about a wide range of different stressors, 
both positive (e.g. marriage) and negative (e.g. death of a spouse). Each item asks if one 
has experienced a particular stressor within the past 18 months and the degree to which 
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the stressor has affected you (in both positive and negative ways). The LES has been 
widely used as a measure of stress in previous literature (Roth, Goode, Williams, & 
Faught, 1994; Harrington, Matheny, Curlette, McCarthy, & Penick, 2005, Schmidt, 
Demulder, & Denham, 2002). This measure supplies both the number of events that have 
occurred in past months, as well as the sum of the perceived impact of negative events. 
For the purposes of this study, we use the perceived negative impact of events occurring 
in the past 18 months as our measure of cumulative life stress at Time One and Time 
Two. The LES produces test-retest reliability coefficients ranging between .56 and .88 for 
the negative impact scale over a five to six week time period. Responses to the LES also 
appear to be relatively free of response bias (Sarason et al., 1978). The present sample 
included individuals who had experienced a wide range of cumulative life stress at Time 
One (M = 15.87, SD = 10.50, Range: 1 - 46) and Time Two (M = 9.82, SD = 9.33, Range: 
0 - 40). For illustrative purposes, an individual who experienced 3 stressful events that 
were perceived as “extremely negative” in the past 18 months would have a score of 9 on 
the LES.  
Stressor controllability. Previous researchers have defined stressor 
controllability in a wide variety of ways (Fleming, Baum, & Singer, 1984; Folkman, 
1984; Heth & Somer, 2002; Roth & Cohen, 1986). For the purposes of the present study, 
I use Heth & Somer’s (2002) definition of stressor controllability, which defines this 
construct as the degree to which “potential outcomes …can be influenced by human 
actions” (Heth & Somer, 2002, p. 885). Using this definition, the more an individual can 
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exert influence over the occurrence and outcome of a stressful event, the more control 
this individual has.  
As mentioned in the Question 2 section above, self report measures of stressor 
controllability may be subject to confounds that may result in biased estimates of 
personal control. Indeed, previous research has shown that many individuals provide 
inaccurate estimates of their personal control across a wide range of contexts (Langer, 
1975; Langer & Roth, 1975). Thus, it was important to develop a more objective measure 
of stressor controllability that yields a relatively unbiased estimate of the controllability 
of participants’ real life stressors. 
To create such an objective measure, a sample of independent coders from the 
community (N=22) provided ratings of the controllability of the original participants’ 
stressors. As shown in Appendix A Table 1, this new sample of coders was matched to 
the original sample on age, sex, race, years of education, and family income. In addition, 
this sample was significantly less depressed than the original sample, suggesting that the 
coders’ controllability ratings were less likely to be driven by high levels of depression. 
Each rater was given the definition of controllability described above, and all coders 
provided ratings for all 46 possible stressors on the LES (the same measure that was used 
to collect the measure of cumulative life stress, described above). Ratings were assigned 
on a 1 to 4 scale, with 1 indicating a very uncontrollable event and 4 indicating a very 
controllable event. Across all 22 coders, the single measure intra-class correlation 
coefficient was 0.54, F(34, 680) = 28.19, p<.001, indicating a moderate degree of 
reliability across coders.  
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The controllability ratings from all coders were averaged to create an overall 
controllability score for each item on the LES. To calculate a total stressor controllability 
score for each participant in the original sample, the controllability scores for each 
stressor on the LES that the participant had experienced in the past 18 months and 
perceived as having a negative impact were averaged. Thus, this composite indicates the 
average amount of control each participant had over the stressors they experienced in the 
past 18 months. The mean controllability score for Time 1 was 2.78 (SD=.36, Range: 
1.23 – 3.33) and for Time 2 it was 2.97 (SD=.39, Range: 1.27 – 3.70).  
Depression symptoms. Depression symptoms were measured at Time One and 
Time Two using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984). This allows 
for the measurement of changes in depressive symptoms over time. The BDI is a self-
report measure consisting of 21 items. Each question consists of four grouped statements 
(for example, “I do not feel sad,” “I feel sad,” “I am sad all of the time and I can’t snap 
out of it,” and “I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it”). Participants are instructed to 
select the item that best describes how they have felt in the past week. One question, 
which pertains to suicidal thoughts, was not included in the current study, leaving a total 
of 20 questions. Each item is scored on a zero to three scale and the total BDI score is 
calculated by summing the scores across all items. The BDI has been shown to have 
adequate internal consistency (Beck & Steer, 1984) and has been very widely used in 
research to measure current depressive symptoms (Brands et al., 2007; Thombs et al., 
2007; Pearlstein, Zlotnick, Battle, Stuart, O’Hara, & Price, 2006; O’Donnell, Wardle, 
Dantzer, & Steptoe, 2006). Because the current sample was, on average, highly stressed, 
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average BDI scores were elevated at Time One (M = 11.85, SD = 9.83) and Time Two 
(M = 11.64, SD = 10.30). 
Cognitive reappraisal ability. Cognitive reappraisal ability, or the amount that 
individuals are able to decrease the amount of sadness they feel when instructed to 
reappraise, was measured in a laboratory paradigm at Time One. Two separate indices of 
CRA were collected:  changes in self-reported sadness and changes in skin conductance 
level.   
Self-reported sadness was measured immediately after each film clip. Participants 
rated, on a nine-point Likert scale, the highest amount of 13 different emotions that were 
experienced during the film that was just watched. Change scores in self-reported sadness 
were calculated by subtracting sadness ratings made after the reappraised sad film from 
sadness ratings made after the baseline sad film. Because the reappraisal film is not the 
same for everyone, raw film ratings were converted to z-scores before the change score 
for each individual was calculated. This variable is referred to as CRA-SAD. Mean 
scores on CRA-SAD were 0.31 (SD = 1.02). 
As in previous research (Troy et al., 2010), I decided a priori that individuals who 
responded to the baseline sad film clip with no sadness (an answer of 1 on the 9 point 
scale) would be excluded from all analyses. Because the baseline sadness induction failed 
for these participants, their CRA scores would be difficult to interpret. 17 participants 
were excluded for this reason, leaving 164 participants for analysis.  
 During the experimental session, physiological channels were sampled 
continuously at 1000 Hz using laboratory software. Later, customized analysis software 
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(Wilhelm, Grossman & Roth, 1999) was applied to physiological data reduction, artifact 
control, and computation of average physiological scores for each participant for each 
film clip. Although multiple physiological measures were obtained, the primary 
physiological measure of interest is skin conductance level (SCL) because it has been 
used previously as an indicator of CRA (Troy et al., 2010).     
SCL is a measure of electrodermal activation. SCL was derived from a signal 
using a constant-voltage device to pass 0.5 V between Beckman electrodes (using an 
electrolyte of sodium chloride in Unibase) attached to the palmar surface of the middle 
phalanges of the first and second fingers of the non-dominant hand. Skin conductance 
level was indexed by the mean level after movement and electrode contact artifacts had 
been edited out using a customized detection procedure (Wilhelm, Grossman & Roth, 
1999). Previous research has found that increases in sadness are associated with 
decreases in SCL (Kreibig, Wilhelm, Roth & Gross, 2007; Kunzmann & Gruhn, 2005; 
Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Based on these findings, we 
believe that greater reappraisal ability will associated with increases in SCL, while a lack 
of reappraisal ability will be characterized by decreases in SCL. This index of CRA is 
referred to as CRA-SCL. Mean scores on CRA-SCL were -0.01 (SD = 0.55). Due to 
technical problems, SCL data was not available for 20 participants. This left 134 
participants available for analyses with CRA-SCL.  
Possible group effects were examined to make sure that there were no significant 
differences between experimental groups on either measure of CRA. T-tests revealed that 
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CRA did not differ significantly between experimental groups using either index of CRA, 





Chapter Three: Results 
Outlier Analysis  
Each variable that is used in the analyses discussed below was examined for 
outliers, which are defined as values greater than three times the inter-quartile range 
above or below the mean (Tukey, 1977). Three variables contained outliers: Time 1 
stressor controllability (n=3), Time 2 stressor controllability (n=4), and CRA-SCL (n=7). 
To ensure that our results were not driven by these extreme values, these outliers were 
removed for all analyses. This left a total of 161 values for analyses with Time 1 stressor 
controllability, 121 values for analyses with Time 2 stressor controllability, and 127 
values for analyses with CRA-SCL.  
Data Analysis Strategy 
 For all regression analyses described below, all continuous predictors were mean 
centered before calculating interaction terms and before entering effects into the models.  
Manipulation Check: Sadness Induction  
To confirm that the three sad film clips induced moderate amounts of sadness, I 
examined mean sadness ratings for each film clip for unmanipulated (uninstructed) film 
viewings (the whole sample for the first sad film, Group 2 for the second sad film, Group 
1 for the third sad film). The mean (SD) sadness ratings were 6.40 (2.21; Film 1), 6.46 
(2.24; Film 2), and 6.26 (2.36; Film 3). The results of paired-samples t-tests indicated that 
all three sad film clips induced significantly greater reports of sadness than the neutral 
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film clip (M = 1.27, SD = 1.13, all ps < .01). In addition, each of the three film clips 
induced significantly greater amounts of sadness than anger, fear, or happiness (all ps < 
.01). Lastly, unmanipulated sadness ratings for Film 1 were not significantly different 
from sadness ratings for Film 2, t(82)=-.10, p=.92, or Film 3, t(81)=.47, p=.64, and there 
were no significant differences between Film 2 and Film 3, t(136)=.31, p=.75. 
Manipulation Check: Cognitive Reappraisal Instruction  
To test whether the reappraisal instructions affected sadness reports consistent 
with instructions (i.e., led to lower levels of sadness on average), we conducted a 
repeated measures ANOVA with film (Sad Film 2 vs. 3) as a within-individual factor and 
experimental group (reappraisal instruction vs. no instruction) as a between-subjects 
factor. To take into account each individual’s sadness baseline, we entered change scores 
from the sad baseline to Sad Films 2 and 3, respectively. These scores are in z-units, and 
a negative score indicates that the individual reported less sadness on the film in question 
than on the baseline sad film. As illustrated in Appendix B Figure 2, the interaction 
between film clip and experimental group was significant, F(1, 162) = 16.85, p <.01. The 
differences observed between groups were in the expected directions (see Appendix B, 
Figure 1): during the second sad film, when Group 1 was asked to use cognitive 
reappraisal and Group 2 was just watching, Group 1 reported significantly lower levels of 
sadness relative to Group 2, t(162) = -3.82, p < .01. During the third sad film clip, when 
Group 2 was asked to use cognitive reappraisal and Group 1 was just watching, Group 
2’s mean sadness ratings were lower than Group 1’s. This group difference, however, 
was not statistically significant, t(162) = 0.64, p = .52.  
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Although not all of the predicted group differences were significant, the direction 
of changes in means on this task suggest that participants were attempting to use 
cognitive reappraisal and at least some were succeeding in their attempts. Additionally, it 
may not be surprising that the group difference on the third sad film was not significant, 
given that Group 1 had been asked to reappraise on an earlier film. This group might 
have persevered using cognitive reappraisal during the last film clip, resulting in lower 
sadness ratings than would have otherwise been observed. Indeed, 45% of participants in 
Group 1 reported that they used reappraisal during the third film clip, even though they 
had not been instructed to do so.  
Discriminant Validity of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability  
The two indices of CRA, CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL, were not significantly 
correlated with one another (r = -.10, p = .22). Therefore, I conducted separate analyses 
for these two indices of CRA.  
 Correlations between CRA-SAD, CRA-SCL, and measures of cumulative stress, 
depressive symptoms, stressor controllability, demographic variables, emotion regulation 
and personality variables, emotional reactivity, and verbal intelligence are shown in 
Appendix A, Table 2. As indicated in Table 2, CRA-SAD was negatively correlated with 
Time 2 cumulative stress and Time 2 depressive symptoms
2
. CRA-SAD was also 
                                                          
2
 Given this pattern of correlations, I also examined whether Time 2 cumulative stress mediates the 
relationship between CRA-SAD and Time 2 depressive symptoms (controlling for Time 1 cumulative 
stress and Time 1 depressive symptoms). The partial correlation between CRA-SAD and Time 2 depressive 
symptoms, controlling for Time 2 stress, was not significant (r=-.12, p=.17), which suggests that Time 2 
stress is a significant mediator. However, the Sobel Test was not significant (p>.05). 
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positively correlated with family income, self-reported cognitive reappraisal ability, 
social desirability, and sadness reactivity. CRA-SAD was also marginally negatively 
correlated with Time 1 Depression (p = .07), and marginally positively correlated with 
extraversion (p = .08). CRA-SCL showed slightly different patterns of association with 
the other variables: there was a significant positive correlation with SCL reactivity, and a 
marginally significant positive correlation with Time 2 depressive symptoms (p = .06). 
CRA-SCL was not significantly associated with any of the other measured variables. 
Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there were no significant gender differences 
on either measure of CRA (both ps >.26). A series of one-way ANOVAs also showed no 
significant relationship between either measure of CRA and race or ethnicity, 
respectively (all ps >.32) 
Discriminant Validity of Stressor Controllability  
Because this is the first study to use this measure of stressor controllability, it was 
important to examine how this new measure relates to other constructs. The correlation 
between Time 1 and Time 2 stressor controllability was significant (r=.31, p<.01). 
Correlations between controllability at both time points and measures of depressive 
symptoms, life stress, CRA, demographic variables, emotion regulation and personality 
factors, emotional reactivity, and verbal intelligence are shown in Appendix A, Table 3.  
 As shown in Table 3, Time 1 controllability was positively related to Time 1 life 
stress. In addition, there was a marginally significant correlation between Time 1 
controllability and Time 2 life stress (p=.10). Time 1 controllability was not significantly 
correlated with any of the other measured variables. Time 2 controllability was positively 
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related to extraversion, but was not significantly correlated with any of the other 
measured variables.  
 A t-test was conducted to examine whether there were significant gender 
differences in controllability scores at both time points. There were no significant gender 
differences in stressor controllability at Time 1, t(159)=-1.36, p=.17. At Time 2, there 
was a significant gender difference, t(115)=-2.28, p=.03, with women exhibiting higher 
levels of stressor controllability (M=3.07, SD=.21) compared to men (M=2.96, SD=.32).  
A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that stressor controllability was not significantly 
associated with race or ethnicity at either time point (all ps>.20). At Time 1, participants 
also provided self-report ratings of how much control they thought they had over the 
most stressful event they had experienced in the past three months on a 1-5 scale. These 
self-report ratings at Time 1 were not significantly correlated with Time 1 stressor 
controllability, r=.12, p=.12, although it is important to note that the measure of stressor 
controllability assessed all negative events that had occurred in the past 18 months, rather 
than just the most stressful event. 
Question One: Does Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Have Long-Term Effects on 
Psychological Health?  
Cross-sectional effects of CRA. First, I examined the cross-sectional effects of 
CRA on depressive symptoms. Depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as the 
dependent variable, and mean centered values for CRA, Time 1 cumulative life stress, 
and the interaction between the two were entered simultaneously into the regression 
model. CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL were examined in two separate regression models. The 
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results of these two regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 4 and Table 5. For 
CRA-SAD, there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress, but no significant 
main effect of CRA-SAD, and no significant interaction between cumulative stress and 
CRA-SAD. The same pattern was observed for CRA-SCL: there was a significant main 
effect of cumulative stress, but no significant main effect of CRA-SCL, and no 
significant interaction. Thus, the cross-sectional interaction between CRA and cumulative 
stress that has been previously reported (Troy et al., 2010) was not replicated. 
Secondary analyses of cross-sectional effects.  A series of secondary analyses 
were performed to investigate the role of trait reappraisal, age, sex, and reactivity in the 
cross-sectional relationship between cumulative stress, CRA, and depressive symptoms. 
For each of the secondary variables that was examined, the mean centered variable was 
added as a main effect to the original regression model described above, along with all 
two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRA, and 
each control variable, respectively. 
For models using CRA-SAD, when each of these models were examined, the two 
way interaction between CRA-SAD and cumulative stress remained non-significant (all 
ps>.10). There were, however, significant three-way interactions between CRA-SAD, 
cumulative stress, and trait reappraisal, β=.13, t(156)=1.98, p=.05, CRA-SAD, 
cumulative stress, and sex, β=.49, t(156)=2.15, p=.03, and CRA-SAD, cumulative stress, 
and sadness reactivity, β=-.22, t(156)=-2.87, p=.005.  
When plotting these three-way interactions, the pattern of the relationship 
between CRA-SAD and cumulative stress in predicting depression was similar (i.e., the 
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relationship was not flipped) for those who were high versus low in trait reappraisal, as 
well as for both men and women. In both cases, the three-way interaction appears to be 
significant because of differences in the strength of the interaction between cumulative 
stress and CRA. For instance, the two-way interaction between cumulative stress and 
CRA-SAD was stronger for those who were high in trait reappraisal, relative to those 
who were low in trait reappraisal. Similarly, the two-way interaction between cumulative 
stress and CRA was marginally significant for women (p=.08), but not significant for 
men (p=.18). Because the pattern of results was not dramatically different depending 
upon trait reappraisal use or sex, I did not examine these 3-way interactions further.  
An examination of the three-way interaction with sadness reactivity revealed that 
CRA-SAD was associated with lower levels of depression at high levels of stress for 
individuals who were high in reactivity, but this protective effect was not present for 
those who were low in reactivity. Although this interaction may indicate an interesting 
phenomenon, it does not appear to be a general pattern across measures – as discussed 
below, the same pattern is not present using CRA-SCL as the indicator of CRA, or when 
examining Time 2 depression. For this reason, the three-way interaction with reactivity 
was not examined further. There was not a significant three-way interaction between 
cumulative stress, CRA, and age (p=.41). 
For models using CRA-SCL, when each of the control variables except for SCL-
reactivity were added to the regression model, the two-way interaction between CRA-
SCL and cumulative stress remained non-significant (all ps>.32). When SCL-reactivity 
was added to the model, the two-way interaction between CRA-SCL and cumulative 
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stress was significant (p=.03). This two-way interaction was qualified by a significant 
three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRA-SCL, and SCL-reactivity, β=.30, 
t(125)=3.44, p=.001. Post-hoc examination of this interaction revealed that CRA-SCL 
was not associated with lower levels of depression for highly stressed individuals at both 
high and low levels of SCL-reactivity. Given the significant three way interaction with 
CRA-SAD, cumulative stress, and reactivity mentioned above, this counterintuitive 
finding might point to a very interesting phenomenon, the reliability of which should be 
examined in future research. There were no significant three-way interactions between 
CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and age, sex, or trait reappraisal, respectively (all ps > .36).  
Prospective effects of CRA. To investigate the prospective effects of CRA, 
another set of multiple regressions was performed. Depressive symptoms at Time 2 were 
entered as the dependent variable, and depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as a 
main effect to the regression model. Additionally, cumulative stress at Time 1, 
cumulative stress at Time 2, and CRA (both indices examined in separate regression 
models) were all entered as main effects. Finally, the interaction between CRA and 
cumulative stress at Time 2 was entered into the model. The results of these regressions 
are shown in Appendix A, Table 6 and Table 7. For the model with CRA-SAD, there was 
a significant main effect of Time 1 depressive symptoms, a significant main effect of 
Time 2 cumulative stress, and a significant interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress 
and CRA-SAD. To examine the interaction, the relationship was plotted using values ± 1 
standard deviation on CRA-SAD and Time 2 cumulative stress, following the procedures 
outlined by Aiken and West (1991). This interaction is shown in Appendix B, Figure 3. 
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Simple slopes analyses revealed that the effect of Time 2 cumulative stress at low levels 
of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.58, t(136)=7.86, p<.001. Likewise, 
the effect of Time 2 cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was also significantly 
greater than zero, β=.37, t(136)=4.23, p<.001. Importantly, however, the effect of CRA-
SAD at low levels of Time 2 cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero, 
β=.04, t(136)=.58, p=.57, while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of Time 2 
cumulative stress was significantly less than zero, β=-.17, t(136)= -2.33, p=.02. Thus, at 
high levels of Time 2 stress, participants with higher levels of CRA-SAD had 
significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms from Time 1 to Time 2, relative to 
those who were low in CRA-SAD. 
For the model with CRA-SCL (shown in Appendix A, Table 7), there were 
significant main effects of Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 2 cumulative stress. 
The main effect of Time 1 cumulative stress was marginally significant (p=.06). Neither 
the main effect of CRA-SCL nor the interaction between CRA-SCL and Time 2 
cumulative stress were significant. 
Secondary analyses of prospective effects. To ensure that the significant 
prospective interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress and CRA-SAD was not driven 
by potential confounds, the model for CRA-SAD described above was re-run, this time 
with sadness reactivity, trait reappraisal, age, and sex, added to the model, respectively. 
When sadness reactivity, trait reappraisal, and age were each added to the 
regression model, the prospective two-way interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress 
and CRA-SAD remained significant (all ps <. 05). When sex was added to the model, the 
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prospective interaction was marginally significant, β=-.09, t(129)= -1.71, p=.09. There 
was no significant main effect of sex on Time 2 depressive symptoms, β=-.06, t(129)= -
1.17, p=.24, and no significant three-way interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress, 
CRA-SAD, and sex, β=.15, t(129)=0.94, p=.35. Therefore, the effect of sex on the 
prospective findings was not examined further.  
Question Two: Do the Protective Effects of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Differ 
Depending on How Controllable the Context is?  
To answer Question Two, a series of multiple regressions was conducted to 
examine the cross-sectional effects of cumulative stress, CRA, and stressor controllability 
on depression. Depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as the dependent variable. 
CRA, Time 1 cumulative stress, and Time 1 stressor controllability were each entered as 
main effects, along with all possible two-way and three-way interactions. Two models 
were run to examine the effects of CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL separately. The results of 
these regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 8 and Table 9. 
Cross-sectional analysis using CRA-SAD. For the model with CRA-SAD 
(Appendix A, Table 8), there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress, a 
significant main effect of CRA-SAD, and a significant two-way interaction between 
CRA-SAD and stressor controllability. There was also a significant three-way interaction 
between cumulative stress, CRA-SAD, and stressor controllability. To examine the three-
way interaction, the relationship was plotted using values ± 1 standard deviation on each 
of the independent variables, following the procedures outlined by Aiken and West 
(1991). This interaction is shown in Appendix B, Figure 4.  
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In the context of more uncontrollable stress (Figure 4, Panel A), simple slopes 
analyses revealed that the effect of cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SAD was 
significantly greater than zero, β=1.14, t(153)=5.66, p<.001. Likewise, the effect of 
cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.38, 
t(153)=2.62, p=.01. Importantly, however, the effect of CRA-SAD at low levels of 
cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero, β=-.04, t(153)=-.32, p=.75, 
while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of cumulative stress was significantly less 
than zero, β=-.80, t(153)= -3.63, p<.001. Thus, in the context of relatively uncontrollable 
stress, the pattern that has been reported in previous research (Troy et al., 2010) was 
replicated; those who were highly stressed and high in CRA-SAD were significantly less 
depressed than those who were highly stressed and low in CRA-SAD. 
In the context of more controllable stress, however, a different pattern was 
observed (Appendix B, Figure 4, Panel B). The effect of cumulative stress at low levels 
of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.39, t(153)=3.35, p=.001. Likewise, 
the effect of cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than 
zero, β=.83, t(153)=6.01, p<.001. Importantly, however, the effect of CRA-SAD at low 
levels of cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero, β=-.10, t(153)=-.93, 
p=.35, while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of cumulative stress was significantly 
greater than zero, β=.33, t(153)=2.61, p=.01. Thus, compared to uncontrollable contexts, 
the relationship between CRA-SAD and depressive symptoms at high levels of stress is 
reversed in the context of controllable stress. Specifically, at high levels of stress, those 
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who are high in CRA-SAD are significantly more depressed than those who are highly 
stressed and low in CRA-SAD. 
Cross-sectional analysis using CRA-SCL. For the model with CRA-SCL 
(Appendix A, Table 9), there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress. In 
addition, there was a significant three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRA-
SCL, and stressor controllability. This interaction is depicted in Appendix B, Figure 5 
using values ± 1 SD from the mean on each of the independent variables.  
In the context of more uncontrollable stress (Figure 5, Panel A), simple slopes 
analyses revealed that the effect of cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SCL was 
significantly greater than zero, β=.99, t(131)=5.70, p<.001. Likewise, the effect of 
cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SCL was also significantly greater than zero, 
β=.62, t(131)=3.97, p<.001. The effect of CRA-SCL at low levels of cumulative stress 
was not significantly different from zero, β=-.08, t(131)=.70, p=.49. At high levels of 
cumulative stress, the effect of CRA-SCL was negative, indicating that those who were 
higher in CRA-SCL had lower levels of depression compared to those with lower CRA-
SCL, however, this difference was not statistically significant, β=-.30, t(131)= -1.45, 
p=.15. Thus, in the context of uncontrollable stress, the pattern observed using CRA-SCL 
is similar to the pattern observed using CRA-SAD. Specifically, when moving from low 
to high stress, the increase in depressive symptoms is smaller for those who are higher in 
CRA-SCL, relative to those who are lower in CRA-SCL. 
Compared to uncontrollable stress, in the context of more controllable stress, a 
different relationship was observed (Appendix B, Figure 5, Panel B). The effect of 
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cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SCL was not significantly greater than zero, 
β=.20, t(131)=1.07, p=.29. However, the effect of cumulative stress at high levels of 
CRA-SCL was significantly greater than zero, β=.80, t(131)=5.09, p<.001. In addition, 
the effect of CRA-SCL at low levels of cumulative stress was not significantly different 
from zero, β=-.15, t(131)=-.88, p=.38, while the effect of CRA-SCL at high levels of 
cumulative stress was significantly greater than zero, β=.46, t(131)=2.61, p=.01. Thus, in 
uncontrollable contexts, the relationship between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and 
depressive symptoms is very similar to the relationship observed using CRA-SAD.  
Specifically, when moving from low to high stress, individuals who are low in CRA-SCL 
did not exhibit significant increases in depressive symptoms. Additionally, at high levels 
of stress, those who are low in CRA-SCL were significantly less depressed than those 
who were high in CRA-SCL. 
Secondary analyses of cross-sectional effects. To ensure that the significant 
three way interactions described above were not driven by potential confounds, a new 
series of regression models was examined, which control for the effects of reactivity, trait 
reappraisal use, sex, and age. For models using CRA-SAD, when each of these control 
variables was entered into the regression model, the three-way interaction between CRA-
SAD, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability remained significant (all ps < .01). In 
addition, there were no significant 4-way interactions between CRA-SAD, cumulative 
stress, stressor controllability, and each of the control variables, respectively (all ps>.24, 
except for the 4-way interaction with sex, p=.09). 
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For regression models using CRA-SCL, when each of the control variables were 
added to the model, the three way interaction between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and 
stressor controllability remained significant (all ps<.03). There were no significant 4-way 
interactions between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, stressor controllability, and any of the 
control variables (all ps>.38, except for the 4-way interaction with age, p=.06).  
Longitudinal prospective effects of CRA across contexts. To investigate 
whether the relationship between CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability 
(described above) prospectively predicts changes in depression, another set of multiple 
regressions were performed. This time, Time 2 depressive symptoms were entered as the 
dependent variable. Time 1 depressive symptoms, Time 1 cumulative stress, and Time 1 
stressor controllability were each entered as independent variables. In addition Time 2 
cumulative stress, Time 2 stressor controllability, and CRA were entered as independent 
variables. This allowed me to assess change in depressive symptoms, change in 
cumulative stress, and change in stressor controllability over time. I additionally added all 
possible two-way interactions between Time 2 cumulative stress, Time 2 stressor 
controllability, and CRA to the model, in addition to the three-way interaction between 
these variables. As above, separate regressions were conducted for CRA-SAD and CRA-
SCL, respectively. The results of these regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 10 
and Table 11.  
For the model with CRA-SAD (Table 10), there were significant main effects of 
Time 1 depressive symptoms, Time 1 stressor controllability, and Time 2 cumulative 
stress. None of the other main effects or interactions in this model were significant. 
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For the model with CRA-SCL (Table 11), there were significant main effects of 
Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 2 cumulative stress. None of the other main 







Chapter Four: Discussion 
Previous research has consistently shown that the trait use of cognitive reappraisal 
allows people to effectively regulate their emotions, and is associated with positive 
psychological health outcomes (Garnefski et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003). More recent 
research has focused on cognitive reappraisal ability, or the degree to which individuals 
can change their emotions when using reappraisal (McRae et al., 2012b, Shiota & 
Levenson, 2009; Troy et al., 2010).  CRA has been shown to be empirically distinct from 
trait reappraisal use (McRae et al., 2012b), and to predict psychological health over and 
above the effects of trait reappraisal use (Troy et al., 2010). Specifically, CRA appears to 
be an important protective factor against depression in the immediate aftermath of stress 
(Troy et al., 2010).  
To date, however, the effects of CRA on psychological health have only been 
examined cross-sectionally. Understanding the long-term relationship between CRA and 
psychological health is an important next step in building a causal model of CRA and 
long-term adjustment to stress. In addition, although most previous research on emotion 
regulation has focused on intraindividual processes, many theoretical accounts suggest 
that no psychological process is inherently adaptive in all contexts (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2000b; Mischel, 1968).  This theoretical perspective suggests that CRA may 
not act as a protective factor in all contexts, and may even be associated with negative 
outcomes in some situations. Although previous research on CRA has not examined 
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whether the observed protective effects are context specific, theoretical considerations 
suggest that one aspect of stressful situations may be especially important: stressor 
controllability. Specifically, CRA may be a particularly adaptive process in 
uncontrollable situations: if very little can be done to change the situation itself, it may be 
better to change one’s emotions instead. In more controllable situations, however, where 
direct action can and should be taken, CRA may be less adaptive.  Thus, the present 
research extends upon previous research on CRA by examining two open questions: 1) 
Does CRA have long-term, prospective effects on psychological health? and 2) Do the 
protective effects of CRA differ depending on how controllable the context is?  
The Prospective Effects of CRA 
Previous research has found that CRA interacts with life stress to predict 
depression, such that those who are highly stressed and high in CRA are significantly less 
depressed than those who are highly stressed and low in CRA (Troy et al., 2010). 
Because these findings are cross-sectional, however, it remains unclear whether CRA is 
implicated in long-term adjustment to stress, and whether or not CRA plays a causal role 
in psychological health. That is, it may be that the effects of CRA on psychological 
health are short-lived, and therefore, not important for long-term outcomes. In addition, it 
is possible that the previously reported relationship between CRA and depression is 
driven by third variable confounds, or the directionality of the relationship between CRA 
and depression is reversed.  
Therefore, in the first part of the present study, I examined the prospective effects 
of CRA on depressive symptoms. As hypothesized, CRA-SAD (the ability to down-
56 
 
regulate feelings of sadness) interacted with changes in stress over six months to predict 
changes in depressive symptoms over six months. Specifically, individuals with large 
increases in stress and high CRA-SAD reported significantly smaller increases in 
depressive symptoms over a six month time period, relative to individuals with large 
increases in stress and low CRA-SAD. Thus, CRA appears to be an important protective 
factor against increases in depression for individuals who are highly stressed.  
Theoretical implications. The observed prospective findings lend support to a 
theoretical model in which cognitive reappraisal ability is critically implicated in long-
term adjustment to stress. These findings advance our understanding of how emotion 
regulation ability contributes to long-term risk and resilience in highly stressed 
populations. In line with previous research (Troy et al., 2010), CRA interacted with stress 
to predict depression, which supports the hypothesis that CRA is particularly important 
for psychological health amongst highly stressed individuals, perhaps because these 
individuals have elevated levels of negative emotions that need to be regulated.  
The fact that individual differences in CRA-SAD preceded the observed changes 
in stress and depressive symptoms strengthens the argument that CRA causally 
contributes to psychological health in highly stressful contexts. That is, the prospective 
design used in this study allows us to rule out the alternative explanations that CRA may 
simply be a side effect of someone’s current life stress, or an indicator of current 
depression. In addition, given that this relationship held when controlling for potential 
key confounds, it is unlikely that the present findings were simply driven by a third 
variable such as trait reappraisal use, sadness reactivity, age, or sex. However, while the 
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present study is an important step in the direction of a causal model of CRA, it does not 
allow for causal conclusions because it did not experimentally manipulate CRA. 
 In addition, these results enhance our understanding of what constitutes 
“successful” cognitive reappraisal. The present results support the hypothesis that, in 
addition to simply using an adaptive strategy like cognitive reappraisal, it is also critically 
important to be able to use this strategy to change one’s emotional states. Importantly, in 
line with previous research (Troy et al., 2010), the laboratory measure of CRA was 
unrelated to trait reappraisal use. In addition, the prospective findings remained 
significant when controlling for trait reappraisal, supporting the hypothesis that CRA 
predicts variance in psychological health over and above the effects of trait reappraisal 
use. These results are consistent with the idea that the frequency of reappraisal use is 
distinct from the ability to use reappraisal, and that these two constructs predict 
psychological health and adjustment to stress differently. It is also important to note that 
the laboratory measure of CRA was unrelated to several potential confounds, including 
cumulative stress, stressor controllability, age, education, self-efficacy, and verbal 
intelligence.  
Notably, CRA-SAD was positively related to self-reported reappraisal ability, 
suggesting that this laboratory challenge measure is valid. The fact that CRA-SAD and 
CRA-SCL did not always predict depression in the same way and, (as shown in 
Appendix A, Table 3) did not always correlate with other measures in the same way 
suggests that these two indices of CRA may be capturing separable constructs, rather than 
two measures of the same thing. It will be important for future research to further 
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examine the regulation of feelings versus the regulation of arousal in order to better 
understand how these potentially independent abilities may differentially relate to 
psychological health. 
Clinical implications. These findings also have several important clinical 
implications. First, these findings support a model of depression in which deficits in the 
ability to effectively regulate negative emotions play a key role in the development and 
maintenance of depression in highly stressed populations. In this way, these findings may 
help to elucidate the etiology of depression and other forms of psychopathology. Second, 
these results have the potential to inform clinical interventions for depression. Notably, 
many existing forms of treatment, especially cognitive therapies, already include large 
components that focus on identifying overly negative appraisals and replacing them with 
more realistic or positive reinterpretations (Campbell-Sils & Barlow, 2007).  This 
practice clearly overlaps with the definition of cognitive reappraisal. In light of the 
current findings, it may be that cognitive therapies that strengthen individuals’ ability to 
use reappraisal will lead to positive clinical outcomes. In particular, interventions that 
target negative appraisals may be particularly beneficial for highly stressed individuals, 
as well as other populations at risk for depression. Importantly, laboratory paradigms like 
the one used in the present study could potentially be used to identify people who are low 
in CRA, and thus, may be at particular risk for developing depression in the face of high 
stress. In this way, at risk individuals could potentially be identified and targeted for 
intervention before psychopathology has developed. 
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Discussion of null effects. It is important to note that the prospective effects that 
were observed for CRA-SAD (based on changes in self-reported sadness) were not 
present when using the second index of CRA, CRA-SCL (changes in skin conductance 
level). It is always difficult to determine why null results are obtained. For instance, if the 
effect sizes are smaller when using CRA-SCL as the index of CRA, the null results may 
have simply been due to a lack of power. Indeed, when examining the significant three 
way interactions between cumulative stress, CRA, and stressor controllability (reported in 
Appendix A, Tables 8 and 9), the effect size associated with the three-way interaction 
using CRA-SAD (change in r²=.04, p=.001) was stronger than the effect size for the 
three-way interaction using CRA-SCL (change in r²=.02, p=.02). Thus, even though both 
interactions were statistically significant, the effect size for the interaction with CRA-
SAD was twice as strong as the interaction with CRA-SCL.  
Additionally, it may be that the ability to change one’s subjective experience of 
sadness is more important for psychological health than one’s ability to change 
physiological arousal. That is, in the long-term, individuals who are only able to change 
their level of physiological arousal, but who are not able to feel subjectively “better” after 
reappraisal may not be protected against increased depression. It will be important for 
future research to better determine whether the present null results are simply due to a 
lack of power, or if physiological indicators of CRA are simply not associated with long-
term psychological health. 
In addition, the present study did not replicate the previously reported cross-
sectional interaction between CRA and cumulative stress in predicting depressive 
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symptoms (Troy et al., 2010). As mentioned above, it is always difficult to interpret null 
effects, and there may be several reasons for this failure to replicate. First, the present 
study recruited individuals who had experienced a stressful life event in the past 8 weeks, 
while the previously reported study recruited individuals who had experienced a stressful 
life event in the past 12 weeks. Therefore, the time period between Time 1 and Time 2 
captured in the present study (between 8 weeks and 6 months after the stressor) partially 
overlaps with the time period captured at Time 1 in the previous study (12 weeks after the 
stressor). Given that reappraisal is thought to be an adaptive strategy because it allows 
individuals to engage with negative events, and to find positive meaning in these events, 
it may be that it takes time after exposure to a stressor for the relationship between CRA 
and depression to emerge. If this is the case, the present sample may not have been far 
enough removed from the initial stress exposure to experience the benefits of CRA. 
Future research could examine this hypothesis by examining several windows of time 
since exposure to stress to better determine when the relationship between CRA and 
depression emerges. If the hypothesis is true, the significant interaction between CRA 
and stress in predicting depression would not be present until 12 weeks or more have 
elapsed since stress exposure. 
Another potential explanation for the lack of cross-sectional effects observed in 
the present study may be the levels of cumulative stress observed at Time 1. Although the 
mean levels of cumulative stress observed in the present study (M=15.9, SD=10.9) are 
comparable to those observed in the previous study (M=15.9, SD=11.5; Troy et al., 
2010), the observed range of scores was narrower in the present study (Range: 1-46) 
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relative to the previous study (Range: 2-60). Thus, the present sample included fewer 
people with very high levels of cumulative stress. Given that predicted differences in 
depression due to CRA were hypothesized (and previously reported) to be at high levels 
of stress, this restriction of range may have been responsible for the null cross-sectional 
results.  
It should be noted, however, that the prospective relationship was significant in 
the current study, even though Time 2 stress levels were not as high as Time 1 stress 
levels (Time 2 cumulative stress M=9.8, SD=9.3, Range: 0-40). It may be that the 
relationship between CRA and depression in the immediate aftermath of stress exposure 
is particularly driven by individuals with very high levels of stress (and presumably the 
highest levels of negative emotions), while the long-term relationship between CRA and 
depression may hold for a wider range of stress levels, as people have more time to use 
reappraisal to make meaning of the stressors they have encountered. Future studies could 
test this hypothesis by recruiting participants with a wider range of stress levels, a wider 
range of time since stress exposure, and more than two data collection points. 
The Protective Effects of CRA in Controllable Versus Uncontrollable Contexts 
 Although previous research (and the prospective results reported above) suggest 
that CRA is an adaptive process that protects against negative psychological health 
outcomes, theoretical models across the social sciences have emphasized that few, if any, 
psychological processes are adaptive in all contexts (Endler & Magnusson, 1976; 
Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000b). This raises the important question of whether there may 
be contexts in which CRA is maladaptive. I hypothesized that CRA is maladaptive (i.e., 
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associated with increased depression) in controllable stressful contexts, where the most 
adaptive coping strategy likely involves taking direct action to decrease the impact of the 
stressor. In uncontrollable stressful situations, however, where more active coping is 
likely not possible, CRA should be an adaptive process because it allows individuals to 
manage the one thing they do have control over: their emotions.  
In the second part of the present research, I found support for the hypothesis that 
the protective effects of CRA would be present in uncontrollable stressful contexts and 
absent in controllable stressful contexts. Specifically, in the context of relatively 
uncontrollable stress, CRA interacted with stress to predict depression, such that those 
who were highly stressed and high in CRA were significantly less depressed than those 
who were highly stressed and low in CRA. That is, for uncontrollable stress, the 
protective effects of CRA that have been reported in past research (Troy et al., 2010) 
were present. In the context of relatively controllable stress, however, this same pattern 
of results was not present. Instead, CRA interacted with stress to predict depressive 
symptoms such that those who were highly stressed and high in CRA were significantly 
more depressed than those who were highly stressed and low in CRA. Thus, the 
protective effects of CRA in the context of controllable stress were reversed, such that 
high CRA was associated with worse psychological health. 
 These results support a novel theoretical model in which the protective effects of 
CRA depend upon the context. In uncontrollable stressful contexts, in which an 
individual is unlikely to be able to diminish the negative effects of a stressor by taking 
direct action, CRA may be a particularly adaptive process because it allows the individual 
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to manage his or her negative emotions and help come to terms with the reality of the 
negative situation. In situations in which nothing else can be done, effective emotion 
regulation should be a particularly adaptive way to arm oneself against negative 
psychological health outcomes.  
In controllable contexts, however, where it is possible for the individual to use 
more direct forms of coping such as active problem solving, CRA may be a maladaptive 
process. From a functionalist perspective, negative emotions can be adaptive, because 
they allow us to respond appropriately to the environment. For example, feelings of 
anxiety may motivate us to work harder if we are worried about an important deadline at 
work. In the context of controllable stress, the presence of negative emotions may be 
particularly adaptive because they motivate individuals to take direct action to cope with 
the stressor at hand. Importantly, however, individuals who successfully down-regulate 
their negative emotions in controllable contexts may not be motivated to take direct 
action, because they are no longer experiencing high levels of negative emotions. That is, 
effective emotion regulation may lead to negative outcomes in the context of controllable 
stress because it leads to lower levels of active coping. The present study does not allow 
for the examination of active coping. Therefore, future research should examine the 
hypothesis that high CRA may lead to lower levels of active coping in controllable 
stressful contexts.  
  Theoretical implications. The present study is one of the first to suggest that 
CRA may be maladaptive in certain contexts. Given that the relationship between 
emotion regulation ability and psychological health appears to be context dependent, 
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these results have very important implications for what “adaptive” emotion regulation is. 
That is, rather than simply considering which emotion regulation strategy is being used, 
and how effectively an individual can use a particular strategy, we also need to consider 
the context in which the strategy is being used. In this way, as others have suggested, the 
most adaptive emotion regulation may involve the flexible deployment of lots of different 
strategies, depending upon the context an individual finds him or herself in (Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010). On a general level, these results suggest that it is important to 
consider the fit between persons (in terms of their ability to use different emotion 
regulation strategies, and the frequency with which they use these strategies) and 
situations (in terms of which strategies are generally adaptive in the specific context that 
the individual is in).  
 In the future, it will be important to continue testing this general theoretical model 
by examining other types of situational factors that may moderate the protective effects 
of CRA. Specifically, other factors related to the nature of stressful life events such as 
stressor predictability, normativeness, and acuteness may all also serve as important 
moderators. For example, it may be that CRA is more adaptive in the context of 
predictable (i.e., stressors that individuals know will happen ahead of time, for instance, 
retirement) stressors because individuals have lots of time to use reappraisal to come to 
terms with the reality of the event before it has even happened, which may enhance the 
protective effects of CRA. Relatedly, CRA may be maladaptive in the context of very 
acute (i.e., very short-lasting) stressors because there may not be an adequate amount of 
65 
 
time for the protective effects of CRA to emerge before the negative effects of the 
stressor have diminished simply as a function of time.  
Although it is likely that numerous contextual factors serve as moderators of the 
effects of CRA, theoretical considerations suggest that the controllability of a stressful 
situation is a key moderator of these effects. That is, uncontrollable stressful situations 
appear to be particularly well-suited for CRA  – when you cannot do anything to change 
the stressor itself, it is adaptive to be able to change your negative emotions. More 
controllable stressful situations appear to be more poorly suited for CRA, when direct 
action and problem solving would be more appropriate forms of coping. 
It bears noting that the two broad forms of coping that have been discussed in the 
present study, emotion focused coping and problem focused coping, are by no means 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, Folkman and Lazarus (1980) have found that most people 
report using a combination of both types of coping when experiencing stress. Therefore, 
the results of the present study do not imply that an individual should never use 
reappraisal in a situation that is controllable. Rather, it appears important to consider the 
degree to which reappraisal is being used, relative to other active forms of coping. Future 
studies that examine both emotion focused coping and active coping are needed to better 
understand how these two forms of coping could be combined in potentially adaptive 
ways. 
Future research should also examine other emotion regulation strategies to 
examine whether the context specificity observed in the present study would extend to 
strategies besides reappraisal. For instance, although suppression has been consistently 
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linked with negative psychological health outcomes (Ehring et al., 2008; Gross & John, 
2003), there may be some situations in which the use of suppression is actually adaptive. 
For example, expressive suppression may be adaptive (or at least, less maladaptive) in the 
context of controllable stress, where not showing how one is feeling may better allow an 
individual to engage in more active coping processes (relative to a strategy like 
reappraisal, which may hinder active coping). On a more general level, it may be that 
emotion regulation strategies that target emotion experience are less adaptive in 
controllable circumstances, while strategies that target emotion expression are less 
adaptive in uncontrollable circumstances. 
It is important to note that the vast majority of research on cognitive reappraisal to 
date has found a positive relationship between the use of this strategy and psychological 
health outcomes (cf. Garenefski et al., 2001; Gross & John, 2003; Kraaij et al., 2002). 
The present study is one of the first to suggest that reappraisal may lead to worse 
psychological health outcomes in certain contexts. This apparent contradiction is likely 
due to a number of factors. First, most research has not examined reappraisal in different 
contexts. The fact that many studies have found significant main effects of reappraisal on 
psychological health while collapsing across contexts, however, suggests that CRA is an 
adaptive process in many different situations. Second, most research has not examined 
reappraisal specifically in the context of high stress. Given that the context specific 
effects of CRA in the present study were only observed among highly stressed 
individuals, it may be that the context specific effects of CRA are not present in less 
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stressful situations. Future research can further test this hypothesis by examining other 
types of stressful contexts and a wide range of stress levels.  
Clinical implications. While many existing clinical interventions may 
specifically target and strengthen CRA (Campbell-Sils & Barlow, 2007), these results 
suggest that individuals should be taught that reappraisal should be used in context 
appropriate ways, rather than simply using it in any emotional situation that an individual 
encounters. Specifically, clinicians could include psycho-educational components in their 
interventions that help clients understand when reappraisal would be a helpful strategy to 
use (i.e., uncontrollable situations), and when it wouldn’t be helpful (i.e., controllable 
situations). In addition, it may be useful to help clients identify alternate emotion 
regulation strategies besides reappraisal that could be used in controllable contexts, such 
as distraction, problem-solving, or situation selection. The current study did not examine 
other regulatory abilities – future research should measure the ability to use other 
strategies like distraction, suppression, and acceptance to try to identify specific 
strategy/context combinations that appear to be adaptive. 
Discussion of null effects. It bears noting that my hypotheses for Question 2 were 
only supported cross-sectionally. When examining the three-way interaction between 
CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability prospectively, the results were not 
significant for either index of CRA. As with other null results in this study, this may have 
been due to a lack of power -- the regression models used to test these hypotheses 
required the presence of a large number of variables in the models, which may have 
resulted in these complex models being underpowered. Indeed, a post-hoc power 
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analysis, based on the size of the longitudinal regression models and the current sample 
size, estimates the minimum detectable β to be 0.3 assuming that power was 80% (Lenth, 
2006-9). Given that the significant three-way interactions between CRA (both indices), 
stressor controllability, and cumulative stress at Time 1 both had βs less than 0.3, it 
seems likely that the Time 2 regression models in question were indeed underpowered.  
 In addition, because the present study design was not experimental, it is possible 
that there could have been an unmeasured third variable that accounted for the observed 
cross-sectional effects. This possibility seems unlikely, given that the results remained 
significant when controlling for key confounds such as reactivity, trait reappraisal, sex, 
and age. In addition, the observed discriminant validity of the CRA measures (see 
Appendix A, Table 2) and the measure of stressor controllability (see Appendix A, Table 
3) was quite high.. In the future, however, it will be important to conduct high-powered 
longitudinal and experimental studies in order to test the claim that the observed 
relationship between CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability predicts long-
term changes in psychological health.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study had several important methodological strengths that allowed me 
to build upon previous research. First, I tested my hypotheses using a large community 
sample of both men and women who represented a wide range of ages, ethnicities, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, the results of the present study are highly 
generalizeable. Second, I used a multi-method laboratory challenge measure of CRA, 
rather than self-reported ability. Thus, my estimates of CRA are unlikely to be 
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contaminated by retrospective biases, self-presentational biases, or a lack of insight into 
one’s regulatory ability. Third, in addition to cross-sectional methods, I employed a 
longitudinal design, which allowed me to assess change in cumulative stress, stressor 
controllability, and depressive symptoms over time. This prospective design allowed me 
to better rule out third variable confounds and to make advances toward a causal model 
of CRA. Fourth, rather than using a self-report measure of stressor controllability, which 
may be confounded with an individual’s current levels of life stress, depression, or 
coping ability, I recruited a separate sample of coders who provided more objective 
ratings of stressor controllability. There are four important limitations to the current 
study, however, that warrant further research. 
 First, the present study only examined individuals’ ability to use reappraisal, 
which is just one of many different strategies that individuals can use to regulate their 
emotions. Indeed, the relationship between other types of regulatory abilities and 
psychological health has not been heavily studied, and remains poorly understood. In 
light of the finding that CRA is not adaptive in all contexts, it will be important for future 
research to examine individual differences in the ability to use other strategies such as 
suppression, acceptance, distraction, and situation selection in order to better understand 
how these abilities predict psychological health, and in which contexts these abilities may 
be adaptive. 
Similarly, I only measured individuals’ ability to use one very specific type of 
cognitive reappraisal: positive reappraisal. Recent research has shown that there are many 
different sub-types of reappraisal, including reappraisals related to self-distancing, 
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challenging reality, or agency (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2004)). 
It may be that individuals have different abilities to use different sub-types of reappraisal, 
and that different types of reappraisal predict psychological health and adjustment to 
stress in different ways. It will be important for future research to examine these 
important hypotheses. With particular regard to intervention and prevention programs, it 
may be helpful to know if an individual is low in the ability to use one type of reappraisal 
but high in the ability to use other types of reappraisal. In this way, unique strengths and 
weaknesses could be identified and targeted for improvement. It will also be important 
for future research to examine the context specific effects of other sub-types of 
reappraisal. For instance, reappraisals targeting an individual’s agency may be 
particularly adaptive in controllable contexts.  
Second, the present study only examined depression as the psychological health 
outcome of interest. This is because depression is one of the most common and one of the 
most debilitating outcomes associated with exposure to stressful life events (Greenberg et 
al., 2003). From a theoretical standpoint, I would predict that CRA is broadly implicated 
in psychological health, which would include other negative outcomes like anxiety 
symptoms and PTSD symptoms, as well as positive outcomes like psychological well-
being and satisfaction with life. The present study, however, did not allow me to examine 
these other outcomes. In addition, the present sample was not a clinical sample but a 
community sample of highly stressed individuals who were at risk for increased 
depression. It remains unknown, therefore, whether the present results would extend to 
clinical populations that have been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. From a 
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theoretical perspective, it seems likely that CRA is an important contributor to 
psychological health in both clinical and non-clinical populations. However, future 
studies are needed to formally test this hypothesis. 
 Third, I assume that CRA is a fairly stable ability that individuals possess, similar 
to intelligence, and is thus relatively unaffected by stress, depression, or socioeconomic 
conditions. The fact that neither index of CRA was significantly correlated with Time 1 
cumulative stress, Time 1 depressive symptoms, stressor controllability, years of 
education, or verbal intelligence lends partial support to this hypothesis. However, the 
present study design did not allow me to assess test-retest reliability of the CRA measure. 
Therefore, it remains unknown whether an individual’s performance on the CRA task is 
relatively stable over time.  
Fourth, future research should continue to examine the validity of the CRA task. 
Although we avoid many important confounds that may be inherent in self-reported 
CRA, it is difficult to know if everyone in our sample was truly using reappraisal during 
the task, and thus, whether or not the CRA scores are truly tapping reappraisal ability and 
not another construct. The fact that CRA was not related to constructs like current 
depressive symptoms, cumulative stress, stressor controllability, age, or verbal 
intelligence, and that it was related to self-reported reappraisal ability certainly lends 
support to the hypothesis that we are measuring CRA with this task. It is still possible, 
however, that some participants did not understand the instructions, or used a different 
strategy during the task. This possibility was minimized by encouraging participants to 
ask questions if they did not understand the instructions, and the participants’ responses 
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to the manipulation check questions indicated that they tried very hard to use reappraisal 
when instructed. However, future research can further explore this question by collecting 
more detailed data from the participants after the task to gain a better understanding of 
what participants are truly doing when they are instructed to reappraise. The fact that we 
still found significant results without being able to examine or remove individuals who 
were not following the instructions suggests that the present results may have been even 
stronger if we had been able to identify such individuals.  
Concluding Comment 
 In sum, the results of the present study show that the ability to use cognitive 
reappraisal ability (CRA) serves as an important protective factor against long-term 
increases in depression. Specifically, CRA interacted with changes in life stress to predict 
changes in depressive symptoms, such that those individuals with large increases in stress 
and high levels of CRA reported significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms 
over a six-month period, relative to individuals with large increases in stress and low 
levels of CRA. These results support the hypothesis that CRA is a critical contributor to 
psychological health in highly stressful contexts. However, part two of the present study 
highlighted the idea that the type of stress that individuals encounter matters. Results 
indicated that the protective effects of CRA are present in the context of uncontrollable 
stress, but the protective effects of CRA were reversed in the context of controllable 
stress. That is, in controllable stressful contexts, CRA was associated with increased 
depressive symptoms. Importantly, this is one of the first studies to show that cognitive 
reappraisal can be maladaptive in some contexts, which suggests that the protective 
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effects of specific emotion regulation strategies are context dependent. These results have 
important implications for understanding how emotion regulation ability contributes to 
risk and resilience in the face of stress, for clinical interventions and prevention 
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Participant Characteristics for Original Sample and Matched Coders 
 
Variable Original Sample Matched Coders Statistic p 
 (n=164) (n=22)   
Mean age (SD) 40.4 (11.5) 38.3 (10.8) t(184)=0.79 .43 
Sex (% female) 50.6 45.5 χ²(1)=0.21 .65 
Race (%)   χ²(4)=1.80 .77 




1.2 0   
Asian 1.2 4.5   
Black 5.5 4.5   







5.6 (1.0) 5.5 (1.0) t(184)=0.38 .71 
Income (1-8; 
<10,000->100,000) 




12.1a (9.9) 8.6b (7.0) t(184)=2.06 .05 
Note. Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p<.05 
level. Specific ns for each comparison may slightly differ due to different numbers of 
missing values across variables. 
86 
 
Table 2.  






Variables in the regression model   
     Time One Depressive Symptoms -.14
†
  .09 
     Time One Cumulative Stress -.12 -.03 
     Time One Stressor Controllability .01 -.06 
     Time Two Depressive Symptoms -.22
*c
    .18
† d
 
     Time Two Cumulative Stress -.20
* c
   .15
 d
 
     Time Two Stressor Controllability .14 -.11 
Demographics   
     Years of Education -.09 -.04 
     Family Income .26
*
  .01 
     Age -.05 -.08 
Emotion Regulation and Personality Variables   
     Trait Reappraisal Use -.01 -.09 
     Self-Reported Reappraisal Ability .18
*
 -.13 
     Self-Efficacy               .12 -.11 
     Social Desirability .22
*
 -.03 
     Neuroticism -.09  .15 
     Extraversion .14
†
 -.14 
Emotional Reactivity   
     Sadness Reactivity .20
*
 .01 
     SCL Reactivity .10
 e
     .36
* f
 





n = 164, except for Time 2 Variables and SCL Reactivity. 
b
n = 127, except for Time Two 
variables and SCL Reactivity. 
c
n = 136. 
d
n = 107. 
e
n = 125. 
f
n = 118. Specific ns for each cell 
differ due to different numbers of missing values across variables. 




























Variables in the regression model   
     Time One Depressive Symptoms .08 -.06 
     Time One Cumulative Stress .21
*
 .03 
     Time Two Depressive Symptoms .03
c
 -.07 
     Time Two Cumulative Stress .15†
c
 -.04 
     CRA-SAD (changes in sadness) .01 .14 







Demographics   
     Years of Education -.07 .04 
     Family Income -.13 .01 
     Age -.11 -.08 
Emotion Regulation and Personality 
Variables 
  
     Trait Reappraisal Use -.04 .08 
     Self-Reported Reappraisal Ability -.05 -.03 
     Self-Efficacy -.08 .08 
     Social Desirability -.07 .07 
     Neuroticism .10 -.03 
     Extraversion -.06 .24
*
 
Emotional Reactivity   
     Sadness Reactivity -.05 .03 









n = 161, except for Time 2 Variables, CRA-SCL, and SCL reactivity. 
b
n = 117, except for CRA-
SCL and SCL reactivity. 
c
n = 134. 
d
n = 126. 
e
n = 123. 
f
n = 93. Specific ns for each cell differ 
due to different numbers of missing values across variables. 






Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SAD: 
Changes in Sadness) and Cumulative Stress.  
 
 
 B  t  p 
Cumulative stress  .61 9.72 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal 
ability (CRA-SAD) 
-.07 -1.09 .28 
Cumulative stress x 
CRA-SAD 
.05 0.87 .39 
Note. R
2





Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SCL: 
Changes in Skin Conductance Level) and Cumulative Stress.  
 
   B   t   p 
Cumulative stress   .62 9.34 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal 
ability (CRA-SCL) 
.10 1.44 .15 
Cumulative stress x 
CRA-SAD 
.01 0.20 .85 
Note. R
2















Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1 
Cumulative Stress, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, and Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-
SAD: Changes in Sadness).  
 
   B    T   p 
Time 1 Depressive symptoms  .53 8.57 .001 
Time 1 Cumulative stress -.07 -1.05 .30 
Time 2 Cumulative stress .48 7.68 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SAD) 
-.06 -1.18 .24 
Time 2 Cumulative stress x CRA-SAD -.10 -2.01 .05 
Note. R
2





Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1 
Cumulative Stress, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, and Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-
SCL: Changes in Skin Conductance Level).  
 
   B    T   p 
Time 1 Depressive symptoms  .59 8.78 .001 
Time 1 Cumulative stress -.14 -1.89 .06 
Time 2 Cumulative stress .49 7.29 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SCL) 
.03 0.51 .62 
Time 2 Cumulative stress x CRA-SCL .02 0.33 .74 
Note. R
2










Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cumulative Stress, Cognitive Reappraisal 
Ability (CRA-SAD; changes in sadness), and Stressor Controllability 
 
   B    T   p 
Cumulative stress (Stress) .69 10.55 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SAD) 
-.15 -2.34 .02 
 Stressor controllability (Control) -.05 -0.66 .51 
Stress x CRA-SAD -.09 -1.21 .23 
Stress x Control -.07 -0.85 .40 
CRA-SAD x Control .26 3.33 .001 
Stress x CRA-SAD x Control .29 3.47 .001 
Note. R
2





Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cumulative Stress, Cognitive Reappraisal 
Ability (CRA-SCL; changes in skin conductance level), and Stressor Controllability 
 
   B    T   p 
Cumulative stress (Stress) .65 9.65 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SCL) 
.02 0.31 .76 
Stressor controllability (Control) -.12 -1.55 .12 
Stress x CRA-SCL .05 0.76 .45 
Stress x Control -.13 -1.73 .09 
CRA-SCL x Control .13 1.57 .12 
Stress x CRA-SCL x Control .21 2.35 .02 
Note. R
2





Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1 
Cumulative Stress, Time 1 Stressor Controllability, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, Cognitive 
Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SAD; changes in sadness), and Time 2 Stressor Controllability 
 
   B    T   p 
Time 1 Depressive Symptoms .49 6.95 .001 
Time 1 Cumulative Stress (T1 Stress) -.05 -0.57 .57 
Time 1 Stressor Controllability -.14 -2.38 .02 
Time 2 Cumulative Stress (T2 Stress) .49 7.17 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SAD) 
-.07 -1.33 .19 
Time 2 Stressor controllability (T2 
Control) 
.03 0.36 .72 
T2 Stress x CRA-SAD -.07 -1.18 .24 
T2 Stress x T2 Control -.05 -0.74 .46 
CRA-SAD x T2 Control .05 0.84 .41 
T2 Stress x CRA-SAD x T2 Control .06 0.88 .38 
Note. R
2




Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1 
Cumulative Stress, Time 1 Stressor Controllability, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, Cognitive 
Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SCL; changes in skin conductance level), and Time 2 Stressor 
Controllability 
 
   B    T   p 
Time 1 Depressive Symptoms .54 7.17 .001 
Time 1 Cumulative Stress -.11 -1.28 .20 
Time 1 Stressor Controllability -.09 -1.41 .16 
Time 2 Cumulative stress (T2 Stress) .48 6.56 .001 
Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-
SCL) 
-.01 -0.18 .86 
Time 2 Stressor controllability (T2 
Control) 
-.03 -0.40 .69 
T2 Stress x CRA-SCL -.05 -0.82 .41 
T2 Stress x T2 Control -.12 -1.68 .10 
CRA-SCL x T2 Control -.11 -1.80 .08 
T2 Stress x CRA-SCL x T2 Control -.09 -1.36 .18 
Note. R
2





Figure 1. Schematic of procedures for measuring cognitive reappraisal ability. All 
participants were randomly assigned to either Group 1 or Group 2. As shown below, the 
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Figure 2. Sadness ratings (change from baseline sad film clip) during the cognitive 
reappraisal task for each experimental group. The Y-axis represents the z-scored sadness 
ratings during either Sad Film 2 or Sad Film 3, minus z-scored sadness ratings during the 
baseline sad film (Film 1). Thus, more negative scores mean greater decrease in self-
reported sadness relative to the baseline sad film. R’s indicate which experimental group 



















































Figure 3. The interaction of Time 2 cumulative stress and cognitive reappraisal ability 
(CRA-SAD) on Time 2 depressive symptoms (BDI scores), controlling for Time 1 
depressive symptoms and Time 1 cumulative stress. Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for 




























Figure 4. The three-way interaction of cumulative stress, cognitive reappraisal ability 
(CRA-SAD), and stressor controllability on current depressive symptoms (BDI scores). 
Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for cumulative stress, CRA-SAD, and stressor 
controllability. Panel A depicts the interaction between cumulative stress and CRA-SAD 
in the context of more uncontrollable stress. Panel B depicts the context of more 



































 Figure 5. The three-way interaction of cumulative stress, cognitive reappraisal ability 
(CRA-SCL), and stressor controllability on current depressive symptoms (BDI scores). 
Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for cumulative stress, CRA-SCL, and stressor 
controllability. Panel A depicts the interaction between cumulative stress and CRA-SCL 
in the context of more uncontrollable stress. Panel B depicts the context of more 
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